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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION THEORY 
AND CAMPUS EMPLOYEE COMPUTER MISUSE 
by 
M. JULIANE SANTIAGO 
 (Under the Direction of Teri Denlea Melton) 
ABSTRACT 
 
 Computer misuse is a leading problem for all industry sectors, including higher 
education. However, much of the current research related to computer misuse has been 
conducted in the business sector, leaving higher education a relatively unstudied group.  
Many theories have been addressed in computer security literature, but only one theory 
offers a more holistic solution to combating computer misuse, Situational Crime 
Prevention Theory.  Situational Crime Prevention Theory encompasses four categories of 
countermeasures: countermeasures that Increase the Perceived Effort of the offender, 
countermeasures that Increase the Perceived Risk of the offender, countermeasures that 
Reduce the Anticipated Rewards of the offender, and countermeasures that Remove the 
Excuses to offend. This study endeavored to investigate whether a relationship exists 
between the categories of countermeasures found in Situational Crime Prevention and the 
actual number of computer misuse incidents reported by CIO’s of public, four-year 
colleges and universities. Using a web-accessible, anonymous questionnaire, CIO’s of 
442 public, four-year colleges and universities were asked to provide information related 
to the countermeasures that they have in place at their institutions and the number of 
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insider computer misuse incidents their institutions experienced in the year 2009. The 
data were analyzed with PLS-Graph software to include composite reliability, t statistic 
and critical value analysis, and R-square analysis. Results showed a significant 
relationship between two out of four categories of countermeasures and the actual 
number of computer misuse incidents. These results would be particularly useful to 
administrators in higher education who are responsible for designing a technology 
security plan that is focused and cost-effective. 
 
INDEX WORDS: Computer misuse, Higher education, Situational crime prevention 
theory
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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
 In September of 2008, hackers accessed an inner computer system of one of the 
most expensive pieces of experimental machinery in history. With a price tag of over $8 
billion, the Large Hadron Collider was designed to reveal the secrets of dark matter, anti-
matter, and possibly even hidden dimensions of space and time. But, armed only with a 
keyboard, individuals calling themselves Group 2600 of the Greek Security Team were 
stopped just short of acquiring complete control of one of the key subsystems for the 
Collider (Keim, 2008). This type of infrequent, high-profile type of computer misuse 
captures the attention of the public, but computer misuse happens everyday, in thousands 
of companies worldwide.  
 In his landmark study of computer misuse, Straub (1990) defined computer 
misuse as “unauthorized and deliberate misuse of assets of the local organizational 
information system by individuals” (p. 257).  Examples of misuse might include 
unauthorized network access, tampering with or stealing sensitive data, abusing e-mail 
privileges, or installing unlicensed software. It is important to note that computer misuse 
can be divided into two categories: misuse committed by an outsider; and, misuse 
committed by an insider.  Though outsiders, or “hackers” receive the most press 
attention, it is insider misuse that costs companies in terms of lost revenue, productivity, 
and image (Computer Crime and Security Survey, 2008; Department for Business 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, 2007). Insider computer misuse can be further 
divided into two categories: misuse that is unintentional in nature and stems from a lack 
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of understanding about current policies and procedures; and, misuse that is intentional in 
nature (Kesar & Rogerson, 1998). Therefore, insider computer misuse can be committed 
through acts of software piracy, theft or destruction of sensitive data, release of malicious 
software, and misuse of email and/or Internet services.  
 Insider computer misuse is not confined to the business sector.  College and 
university campuses also experience this type of computer misuse. In the 2006 survey of 
information technology (IT) security in higher education, Kvavik and Voloudakis (2006), 
working with the Educause Center for Applied Research (ECAR), found that 26% of 
responding campuses reported compromise of confidential information, and 12.5% 
reported damage to data. It should be noted that ECAR does not differentiate between 
insider and outsider computer misuse in their findings, but they do report that 
Baccalaureate and Associate’s institutions are more concerned with unlicensed use of 
digital products and employees’ misuse of computers, respectively.  Further, in their 
study of college students, Cronan, Foltz, and Jones (2006) found that 34% of responding 
students admitted to software misuse or piracy, and 22% admitted to committing data 
misuse. 
 Additionally, campus administrators are faced with implementing an effective 
security plan within the confines of a relatively small IT security budget. Therefore, a 
well-targeted, cost-efficient and effective security plan is at the forefront of the battle 
against insider computer misuse on college campuses. Situational Crime Prevention, a 
theory from criminology, offers several factors that have the potential to assist 
administrators in creating an effective security plan.  However, little, if any, research 
exists to establish the relationship of Situational Crime Prevention to the IT security field. 
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 Many researchers have outlined various countermeasures to help combat insider 
computer misuse (Aldhizer, 2008; D’Arcy & Hovav, 2007; Harrington, 1996; Kesar & 
Rogerson, 1998).  These countermeasures can be divided into two broad categories: 
technical controls, such as passwords and firewalls; and, formal or management-type 
controls, such as codes of ethics and acceptable use policies.  Researchers agree that the 
most effective security plan includes elements from both categories of countermeasures 
(Dhillon & Moores , 2001; Straub, 1990; Willison & Backhouse, 2006).   
 An examination of computer security literature reveals three theories, all 
originating from the field of criminology, that have captured the attention of researchers: 
General Deterrence Theory, Rational Choice Theory and Situational Crime Prevention. 
While these three theories share some commonalities in their basic assumptions, there are 
significant differences in their focus. 
 The foundation of General Deterrence Theory is the assumption that punishment 
should be “certain, swift and proportionately severe” (Paternoster & Bachman, 2001, p. 
14).  The general assumption behind the theory is that people tend to use cost/benefit 
analysis when making any important decision, whether that decision is related to their 
career, a major purchase, or even a criminal act.  This cost/benefit analysis may include 
factors such as the ease of committing a crime, the likelihood of getting caught, and the 
potential rewards of success.  Unlike other theories in criminology, this theory 
specifically supports the belief that an appropriately harsh punishment that is sure to 
follow a crime will tilt the scales more toward the cost end of the spectrum, in effect, 
deterring an individual from committing a crime (Paternoster & Bachman). 
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 While General Deterrence Theory focuses on factors that may deter someone 
from committing a crime due to the fear of punishment, the Rational Choice Theory 
focuses on decisions that criminals make during the commission of a crime (Cornish & 
Clarke, 1986).  The assumption of Rational Choice Theory is the idea that people make 
the decision to commit a crime much like they make a decision in other mundane tasks, 
such as buying a television or a car, a process described by the expected utility model 
(Paternoster & Bachman, 2001).  They weigh the costs and benefits of a given action and 
then make a decision.  It is through the study of criminals’ decision-making process that 
researchers can devise ways to make crime more costly to the criminal, thereby 
preventing criminal behavior by tilting the costs to outweigh the benefits of the criminal 
act. 
 Finally, Situational Crime Prevention Theory shares a theoretical underpinning 
with Rational Choice Theory, in that both theories do not try to explain the criminal, only 
the criminal act itself (Clarke, 1997). Situational Crime Prevention Theory attempts to 
prevent crime by altering various situational factors that influence a criminal’s decision to 
commit a crime.  The theory does not address the detection or sanctioning of offenders, 
nor does it address the reduction of criminal tendencies through social means; its goal is 
to make a criminal act less appealing to offenders.   
 Clarke (1997) outlined 16 “opportunity-reducing” techniques in his original 
Situational Crime Prevention Theory.  These 16 techniques are grouped into four 
categories (Increase Perceived Effort, Increase Perceived Risk, Decrease Anticipated 
Reward, and Remove Excuses) which impact a criminal’s decision to commit a crime 
through either increasing the cost or reducing the benefit, or removing the justification for 
18  
commission.   
 Beebe and Rao (2005) took Clark’s (1997) original crime opportunity-reducing 
techniques and applied them to the field of computer security, creating a comprehensive 
and more holistic set of countermeasures that consist of both technical and formal, 
management-type controls.  Table 1 aligns Clarke’s original 16 opportunity reducing 
technique with a typical traditional crime countermeasure and a corresponding computer 
misuse countermeasure (Beebe & Rao). 
19  
Table 1   
Situational Crime Prevention Techniques as Applied to Traditional Crime and Computer 
Misuse 
Technique Traditional Crime 
Countermeasure 
Computer Misuse 
Countermeasure 
1. Target hardening Locks, safes, fences, 
armed guards 
Firewalls, closed ports, 
vulnerability patches 
2. Access control Gate codes, guard shack, 
receptionist, swipe cards 
ID/authentication systems, 
digital certificates 
3. Deflecting 
offenders 
Pedestrian/auto traffic 
redirection, no loitering 
Honeypots/honeynets, 
information segregation 
4. Controlling 
facilitators 
Gun control, limit ability 
to communicate 
Masking IP addresses, 
leased lines, no broadcast 
5. Entry/exit 
screenings 
Metal detectors, screeners, 
merchandise tagging 
Intrusion detection system, 
virus scanning 
6. Formal 
surveillance 
CCTV, security guards, 
police patrols 
Auditing and log reviews, 
anomaly detection 
7. Surveillance by 
employees 
Responsibility and/or 
ability to monitor 
Resource usage info, user 
training, reporting policies 
8. Natural 
surveillance 
Lights, etc. so passers-by 
can see activity in the 
building 
Tamper-proof network 
cabling, visualization tools 
9. Target removal Electronic donations vs. 
cash, cash diverted to safe 
Information and hardware 
segregation, DMZ’s 
10. Identifying 
property 
VIN etched into auto 
glass, write name in book 
Information classification, 
watermarking 
11. Reducing 
temptation 
Obscure valuables, gender 
neutral phonebook 
Minimize reconnaissance 
info, no port bannering 
12. Denying benefits Security coded car radios, 
ink tags on clothing 
Encryption, automatic data 
destruction mechanisms 
13. Rule 
setting/clarification 
Acceptable use policy, 
clear laws, licensing 
procedures 
Acceptable use policy, user 
agreements, clear laws 
14. Stimulating 
conscience 
“Shoplifting is stealing” 
signs, “current speed is” 
Multi-level warning 
banners, codes of ethics 
15. Controlling 
disinhibitors 
Controlling drugs/alcohol, 
propaganda, violent TV 
Cyber-ethics education, 
supervised computer use 
16. Facilitating 
compliance 
“Graffiti boards”, public 
urinals, shelters, barriers 
“Hacker challenges,” 
employment opportunities 
(adapted from Beebe & Rao, 2005) 
 Situational Crime Prevention has proven successful in reducing crime in many 
types of situations including aircraft hijackings, post office robberies, and bank robberies 
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(Clarke, 1997; Ekblom, 1988; Gabor, 1990; Grandjean, 1990; Wilkinson, 1986).  Its 
effectiveness in the field of computer security, however, has yet to be established, though 
the potential for success in reducing computer misuse is very promising. The theory’s 
straightforward focus on situational factors that can prevent criminal behavior and, in a 
computer security setting, its holistic approach to technical and formal, management-type 
controls, offers an adaptable security plan that may be used to reduce insider computer 
misuse in many situations. 
 Implementation of any type of IT security in higher education is challenging.  
There is a constant struggle between an IT security specialist’s need to implement a 
strong security plan and academia’s need to exchange ideas and encourage exploration 
(Oblinger, 2003). Therefore, a higher education campus offers a unique setting to explore 
the relationship between Situational Crime Prevention and insider computer misuse, such 
as software piracy and inappropriate email and/or Internet usage.  Additionally, much of 
the prior research on misuse countermeasures has focused on insider computer misuse in 
the business environment, leaving college campus employees a relatively unstudied 
group.  
Statement of the Problem 
 Computer misuse is a leading problem for all industry sectors, including colleges 
and universities. Though many researchers have proposed different countermeasures to 
combat the problem, there is no clear solution. It could be argued that many of the 
countermeasures found in the literature are too one-sided; some countermeasures focus 
completely on technical countermeasures, such as passwords and firewalls, to the 
exclusion of administrative controls, such as a clearly stated Acceptable Use Policy, or 
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vice versa. A combination of the two types of countermeasures might prove to be the 
most effective solution. 
 Situational Crime Prevention Theory outlines a number of technical and 
administrative countermeasures to prevent insider computer misuse. When applied to the 
field of information technology, a more holistic approach to preventing insider computer 
misuse emerges. However, to date, there is no study in either the business environment or 
higher education environment regarding the relationship between Situational Crime 
Prevention and insider computer misuse. 
Purpose Statement 
 The purpose of this study was to explore the relationship between the categories 
of countermeasures in Situational Crime Prevention Theory and the number of insider 
computer misuse incidents on college campuses.  
 College and university campuses are not immune to computer misuse incidents.  
Often, their information technology security budgets are smaller than most business 
budgets, necessitating use of the most effective security countermeasures. The researcher 
explored the above relationships as an effort to help campus IT departments choose the 
most efficient and effective security countermeasures.  From this data, the researcher 
responded to the following research questions. 
Research Questions 
R1 – To what extent are the countermeasures that increase the perceived effort to commit 
insider computer misuse related to the number of insider computer misuse incidents on 
campus? 
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R2 – To what extent are the countermeasures that increase the perceived risk of 
committing insider computer misuse related to the number of insider computer misuse 
incidents on campus? 
R3 – To what extent are the countermeasures that decrease the anticipated reward for 
committing insider computer misuse related to the number of insider computer misuse 
incidents on campus? 
R4 – To what extent are the countermeasures that remove the excuses for committing 
insider computer misuse related to the number of insider computer misuse incidents on 
campus? 
R5 – What are the respondents’ top five countermeasures in terms of perceived 
effectiveness? 
 Figure 1 shows the conceptual framework model, including independent and 
dependent constructs, and labeled research questions. 
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Figure 1: Conceptual Framework with Labeled Research Questions 
Significance of the Study 
 The number of reported computer misuse incidents continues to be unacceptably 
high in industry surveys, both in the United States and the United Kingdom (Computer 
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Crime and Security Survey, 2008; Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform, 2007).  Losses from computer misuse incidents can be categorized as monetary 
losses, often as much as hundreds of thousands of dollars, productivity losses, and 
damage to an institution’s reputation if sensitive information is leaked.  Despite the 
pervasive reports of security-related and computer misuse incidents, no one method or 
combination of methods, has proven consistently effective in preventing these incidents 
of misuse (Aldhizer, 2008; D’Arcy & Hovav, 2007; Harrington, 1996; Kesar & 
Rogerson, 1998; Straub, 1990).  Additionally, most published research related to the 
prevention of computer misuse has concentrated on the business sector, not colleges and 
universities.   
 It was posited that the current research would provide empirical evidence for 
Situational Crime Prevention’s application in the field of computer security within higher 
education.  The data may yield the identification of effective countermeasures, thereby 
providing a roadmap for institutions seeking an effective plan for preventing computer 
misuse.  An effective, well-targeted security plan should reduce the costs associated with 
incidents of computer misuse and the costs of plan implementation.  While this reduction 
in cost should benefit all business sectors, it should be especially important to colleges 
and universities whose resources may be more limited.  
 In addition to the implications for reducing cost, data from the current research 
have implications for leaders in higher education in terms of security policy. Educational 
leaders in the area of IT security face an unprecedented amount of pressure to ensure the 
confidentiality of personal data and offer an extremely high level of system availability.  
25  
While an effective security plan will support both of these requirements, it is security 
policy that will ultimately drive the security plan.  
Procedures 
 This correlational study was conducted using a quantitative approach.  The target 
population was public four-year colleges and universities throughout the United States.  
Respondents were the Chief Information Officer (CIO) or an administrator of equivalent 
responsibility at each institution. Because of the large target population and the sensitive 
nature of reporting computer security and computer misuse information, an anonymous, 
web-accessible questionnaire was deemed the best method to collect data. 
 The researcher-developed instrument included questions related to the security 
measures in place at each college or university and the number of known insider 
computer misuse incidents in the last year.  Additionally, data were collected regarding 
the CIO’s top five countermeasures in terms of perceived effectiveness.  Following IRB 
approval, a pilot test involving eight colleges and/or universities was performed to ensure 
face validity and that the questionnaire wording and definitions were clear to the 
respondents.  The questionnaire was edited and invitations were sent to 442 CIO’s. 
Resulting questionnaire data were analyzed using PLS Graph software.  PLS Graph 
utilizes structural equation modeling using a partial least squares approach. Because PLS 
Graph places minimal demands on criteria such as sample size, it is an appropriate choice 
for theory confirmation in exploratory studies (Chin, 1998). Incomplete questionnaires 
were discarded. 
 
 
26  
Limitations and Delimitations 
 The researcher identified the following limitations of the study.  Due to the 
sensitive nature of computer security incidents, respondents may be reluctant to share that 
information, and/or to be open and honest.  However, the anonymity of the administration 
of the instrument helped to mitigate this limitation. Additionally, the questionnaire 
instrument was researcher-developed, and the researcher is making the assumption that 
the instrument measures what it proposes to measure.  To lessen the effects of this 
limitation, a pilot test was performed to ensure face validity, and discriminant validity 
was completed.  A final limitation was the use of categories to summarize the reported 
computer misuse incidents. To date, there is no set standard for the categorization of 
computer misuse incidents. 
 The study was delimited to include all public four-year institutions of higher 
education within the United States.  Of 653 public four-year institutions, the researcher 
identified 442 CIO contact names and emails. 
Definition of Key Terms 
Computer misuse - Based on Straub’s (1990) definition, this study defines computer 
misuse as the unauthorized and deliberate misuse of an organization’s computer 
resources, including: hardware (computers, servers, storage devices and 
peripheral devices); software (theft and/or illegal copying); data (theft and/or 
modification or destruction of data); and, service (use of email or Internet access 
for non-work related activities). For the purposes of this study, computer misuse 
will be measured by the number of incidents in the last 12 months that each CIO 
reports on the survey. 
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Countermeasures – Based upon definitions found in the literature, countermeasures are 
the broad groups of controls that are utilized to guard against computer misuse 
(Backhouse & Dhillon, 1995; Dhillon & Moores, 2001; Dhillon, Silva, & 
Backhouse, 2004; Hoffer & Straub, 1994).  
Insider - For the purposes of this study, an insider is a current or former employee of a 
college or university.   
Insider computer misuse – For the purposes of this study, insider computer misuse is 
misuse of computer resources by a current or former employee of a college or 
university. 
Public four-year college/university – For the purposes of this study, a public four-year 
college/university is an institution of higher education that is supported primarily 
by public funds and offers programs of at least four years duration or one that 
offers programs at or above the baccalaureate level.  
Chapter Summary 
 Though high-profile computer security misuse, such as the attack on the Large 
Hadron Collider, is relatively infrequent, computer misuse committed by insiders is an 
ongoing problem that occurs every day and in every industry.  Computer misuse is not 
simply a nuisance for administrators; consequences of insider computer misuse can range 
from damage to a company’s reputation to considerable financial losses.  Colleges and 
universities can be particularly vulnerable to these incidents because their IT security 
budgets may be smaller than most business’ budgets and can, therefore, implement only 
the most cost-efficient and effective security countermeasures.   
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 Situational Crime Prevention, a theory originating in criminology, outlines a 
number of technical and administrative countermeasures to prevent crime.  When applied 
to the field of computer security, a more holistic and potentially effective approach to 
preventing insider computer misuse emerges.  Situational Crime Prevention’s relationship 
to insider computer misuse, however, has yet to be empirically explored. 
 Therefore, the purpose of this correlational study was to explore the relationship 
between the categories of countermeasures inherent in Situational Crime Prevention 
Theory and the number of known computer misuse incidents on college campuses. The 
researcher-developed instrument included questions related to the countermeasures in 
place at each college or university, the CIO’s top five countermeasures in terms of 
perceived effectiveness, and the number of known insider computer misuse incidents in 
the year 2009.   
A pilot test of eight colleges and/or universities was performed to ensure face 
validity and that the instrument questions were worded clearly.  The target population 
was current CIO’s or administrators of equivalent position within public four-year 
institutions of higher education in the United States.  The questionnaire was made 
electronically available via the web.  Data analysis was completed using PLS Graph.  It 
was posited that the study has implication for higher education institutions in the creation 
of appropriate security policy to drive the most effective and cost-efficient security plan 
possible.   
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Introduction 
 The infiltration of an inner computer system of the Large Hadron Collider, an $8 
billion piece of experimental machinery, captured worldwide attention in September of 
2008. Armed only with a keyboard, individuals calling themselves Group 2600 of the 
Greek Security Team were stopped just short of acquiring complete control of one of the 
key subsystems for the Collider (Keim, 2008).  This type of infrequent, high-profile 
exploit captures the attention of the public, but computer misuse happens everyday, in 
thousands of companies worldwide.   
 As this study sought to explore the issue of insider computer misuse within higher 
education, it is important to study computer misuse as a general area of research in the 
field of information technology and then frame the topic within higher education. Though 
higher education institutions face many of the same issues as business institutions, the 
topic of culture within higher education becomes an important issue, even within the field 
of computer misuse. Finally, an examination of three criminological theories often 
applied to computer misuse was presented. 
Computer Misuse as a Pervasive Problem 
 In his landmark study of computer misuse, Straub (1990) defined computer 
misuse as “unauthorized and deliberate misuse of assets of the local organizational 
information system by individuals” (p. 257).  Examples of misuse might include 
unauthorized network access, tampering with or stealing sensitive data, abusing e-mail 
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privileges, or installing unlicensed software.  Though the field of information security has 
made progress in combating misuse, statistics show that the problem has not been 
curtailed and, in many cases, is still increasing.  The Computer Security Institute 
distributed its Computer Crime and Security Survey (2008) to over five thousand 
computer security professionals in corporations, government agencies, financial 
institutions, medical facilities, and universities in the United States.  Findings indicated 
that the average annual loss related to each incident of computer misuse was close to 
$300,000.   Forty-three percent of respondents reported at least one security-related 
incident in the year 2008.  Of these 43%, 49% of companies experienced a virus incident, 
and 46% of companies reported at least one incident of insider network misuse. 
 The Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (2007) in the 
United Kingdom performed a security survey very similar to the Computer Security 
Institute.  The methodology consisted of a structured questionnaire given by telephone 
survey to the person responsible for information security at randomly chosen businesses 
in the United Kingdom.  The Department also considered the fact that the majority of 
businesses in the United Kingdom tend to be small in size.  In order to provide equal 
representation for large size businesses, the Department chose to boost the sample for this 
group and weight the results.  In total, 1,007 interviews were completed.  The percentage 
of companies that reported a serious security-related incident in 2006 was 45% for small 
companies (less than 50 employees), 72% for large companies (greater than 250 
employees), and 96% for very large companies (greater than 500 employees).   
 These incidence figures from the United States and United Kingdom are 
significant in two ways.  First, the reported figures may be underrepresented because 
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many companies choose not to report computer misuse incidents due to the possibility of 
negative publicity (Hoffer & Straub, 1994).  Second, the figures from the United 
Kingdom show a marked increase in security-related incidents in relation to company 
size.  It could be that the larger companies pose a more lucrative target for a hacker, or 
outsider, seeking access to sensitive or financial data.  More likely, however, it is the 
employee, or insider, that is committing the computer misuse.  The Computer Security 
Institute’s 2007 survey showed that insider misuse accounted for 59% of security 
incidents, and the Institute’s 2008 survey showed that insider misuse accounted for 44% 
of security incidents.  
 Computer misuse can be divided into two categories: misuse committed by an 
outsider and misuse committed by an insider.  Though the outside “hacking” incidents 
receive the most press attention, insider computer misuse accounts for a significant 
percentage of losses experienced each year.  Statistics from both the Computer Security 
Institute’s 2008 survey and the United Kingdom’s Department for Business Enterprise 
and Regulatory Reform’s 2007 survey support this assertion.  While the most prevalent 
problem reported was virus infiltration, the second-most most prevalent security problem 
reported by the Computer Security Institute’s survey was insider misuse, including e-mail 
misuse, trafficking pornography or pirated software, and unauthorized network access.   
The United Kingdom survey reported that 47% of large companies suffered some type of 
employee misuse of computer resources, with misuse of web access and email reported 
the most often.   
 Further, Fortiva, Inc. (2005) reported that 68% of U.S. employees who normally 
use email at work have sent or received at least one inappropriate email using their work 
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account.  Though most people do not think that sending or receiving inappropriate email 
can have serious consequences for a company, Chevron Corporation was ordered to pay 
over $2 million to female employees in settlement of a sexual harassment lawsuit that 
originated with an inappropriate email that was circulated by male employees (Verespej, 
2000).   
 The evidence shows that insider computer misuse is a problem.  The next question 
becomes how to combat it. 
Discussion of Countermeasures 
 Insider computer misuse is not a new phenomenon, and numerous studies have 
addressed the problem and discussed recommended countermeasures.  When examined 
holistically, the countermeasures fall into two overall categories: technical controls and 
administrative controls.   
Technical Countermeasures 
Technical countermeasures are those controls which often are technology-based.  
The most common countermeasures found in the literature include authentication for 
resource access, monitoring software, and data access control using security levels 
(Aldhizer, 2008; D’Arcy & Hovav, 2007; Panko & Beh, 2002; Straub, 1990; 
Urbaczewski & Jessup, 2002).  Authentication involves the appropriate use of a username 
and password combination in order to control access to a network or data.  Monitoring 
software could be in the form of email filtering and monitoring for offensive words, or 
Internet surfing monitoring to ensure that employees do not access or download offensive 
material.  Data access control involves classifying data according to its sensitivity and 
then assigning rights to those employees who can access it.   
33  
 Data from the Computer Security Institute’s 2008 survey supports the presence of 
these common technical controls.  Following are some of the most common types of 
technical countermeasures to deter computer misuse followed by the percentage of 
companies that utilized them:  account login and password: 46%; log management 
software: 51%; web monitoring software: 49%; and, email monitoring software: 49%.  
Table 2 below outlines some of the most common technical countermeasures to combat 
insider computer misuse with a corresponding reference in the literature.  It should be 
noted, however, that the reference list is not meant to be exhaustive as the most common 
countermeasures are mentioned countless times in computer security literature. 
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Table 2  
Common Technical Countermeasures with Corresponding Reference 
Countermeasure Reference 
Firewalls Beebe & Rao, 2005; Computer Security 
Institute, 2008; Johnson & Ugray, 2007; 
Kvavik & Voloudakis, 2006; Pfleeger & 
Pfleeger, 2007  
Physical security Beebe & Rao, 2005; Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 
2007; Straub & Welke, 1998 
Authentication* Kvavik & Voloudakis, 2006; Pfleeger & 
Pfleeger, 2007; Straub & Welke, 1998 
Kerberos* Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2007 
Access control lists* Kankanhalli, Teo, Tan & Wei, 2003; 
Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2007 
Proxy servers* Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2007 
Virus scanning Beebe & Rao, 2005; Computer Security 
Institute, 2008; Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2007 
Login/logout rules and procedures* Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2007 
Email monitoring software* Johnson & Ugray, 2007; Phyo & Furnell, 
2004 
Web usage monitoring software* Johnston & Ugray, 2007; Phyo & Furnell, 
2004 
Database partitioning and use of data 
views* 
Kankanhalli, Teo, Tan & Wei, 2003; 
Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2007 
Data sensitivity classification Beebe & Rao, 2005 
Auditing and log reviews Beebe & Rao, 2005; Kvavik & 
Voloudakis, 2006; Phyo & Furnell, 2004 
Review of resource information Beebe & Rao, 2005 
Cameras in data sensitive areas and/or 
video surveillance* 
Booker & Kitchens, 2010; Hu, Tan, Wang 
& Maybank, 2004 
Automatic data destruction Beebe & Rao, 2005 
Virtual Private Networks* Computer Security Institute, 2007; Kvavik 
& Voloudakis, 2006; Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 
2007 
Encryption Computer Security Institute, 2007; Beebe 
& Rao, 2005; Kvavik & Voloudakis, 2006; 
Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2007 
Network packet shaping* Phyo & Furnell, 2004 
Controlled distribution of software* Kvavik & Voloudakis, 2006 
Screen saver lock* USDA security policies, n.d. 
* countermeasure added by researcher 
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 Though no one can refute the importance of technical security controls, many 
authors reflect upon the propensity of some companies to rely solely on these technical 
countermeasures (Osborne, 1998; Parker, 1997; von Solms, 2001).  With a complete 
emphasis on technical controls, the problem of computer misuse becomes very one-sided, 
and the holistic nature of computer security is lost.  The other side of the security coin is 
the presence of administrative controls, such as codes of ethics and employee security 
awareness training.   
Administrative Countermeasures 
 Administrative countermeasures are not necessarily based on technology; they are 
rooted more in policy, ethics, and training.  The field of ethics is an integral part of the 
study of insider computer misuse, and many companies put their faith into codes of ethics 
and acceptable use policies.  These companies might also participate in employee 
security training.  The Computer Security Institute’s 2008 survey found that 82% of 
companies provide some type of awareness training for their employees.  The United 
Kingdom’s Department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform’s 2007 survey 
shows that 55% of companies surveyed have a documented security policy, and 40% 
provide employee security training.  It also appears that 86% of large businesses surveyed 
provided an acceptable use policy to their employees.  However, there is controversy 
over the effectiveness of acceptable use policies and codes of ethics without the presence 
of technical controls.  Harrington (1996) did not find a uniform relationship between 
codes of ethics and computer misuse judgments and intentions of information systems 
employees.  It appeared that, overall, the presence of a code of ethics did not greatly 
impact employees intentions to commit misuse.  Similarly, von der Embse, Desai, and 
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Desai (2004) found that ethical codes and policies simply do not effectively guide ethical 
behavior.  Table 3 shows some of the more common administrative or formal 
countermeasures with corresponding references in the literature.  Like the technical 
countermeasures described previously, many countermeasures are mentioned in countless 
articles and textbooks.  Therefore, the reference list provided here is not meant to be 
exhaustive. 
Table 3 
 Common Administrative Countermeasures with Corresponding Reference 
Countermeasure Reference 
Presence of and dissemination of Codes of 
Ethics, Acceptable Use Policies, User 
Agreements, Misuse Reporting Policies, 
and/or Internet Use Policies 
Beebe & Rao, 2005; D’Arcy, Hovav & 
Galletta, 2009; Dhillon & Moores , 2001; 
Dominguez, Ramaswamy, Martinez & 
Cleal, 2010; Harrington, 1996; Johnson & 
Ugray, 2007; Straub, 1990 
Supervised computer use Beebe & Rao, 2005 
Cyber-ethics education Beebe & Rao, 2005 
Clearly defined job duties and/or rules* Backhouse & Dhillon, 1995; Dhillon & 
Moores, 2001 
Password policies* Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2007; Straub & 
Welke, 1998 
Required training for all new users* Straub & Welke, 1998 
Offer software to employees at reduced 
prices* 
Chiang & Assane, 2002 
* countermeasure added by researcher 
 
Combination of Technical and Administrative Countermeasures 
 In order to implement the most effective security plan possible, there must be both 
technical controls and administrative-type controls in place.  Many institutions choose to 
implement acceptable use polices or codes of ethics to enhance the effectiveness of 
deterring insider computer misuse through technical controls.  Straub (1990) found that, 
in addition to technical controls, the process of informing users of what constitutes 
unacceptable computer behavior and the corresponding penalties for said misuse in 
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addition to computer awareness training sessions are effective deterrents.  Similarly, 
Dhillon and Moores (2001) advocated the use of technical controls, such as controlling 
access to computer systems, in addition to written policies and employee security training 
and education.  Willison and Backhouse (2006) compared effective security to a house of 
cards.  Neglect in any one area will impact another area and possibly create an 
opportunity for misuse; thereby, reinforcing the need for a more cohesive approach 
involving both technical and policy controls.   
 With researchers demonstrating the effectiveness of a two-sided defense 
consisting of technical controls and policies against employee computer misuse, why 
does computer misuse still occur?  The answer is that people, their behavior, and their 
motivations are at the heart of computer security, and what works in the business 
environment may be completely inappropriate and/or ineffective in higher education.   
Computer Security in Higher Education 
 The studies and surveys mentioned so far originated within the business 
environment.  A search of the literature revealed only two studies related to computer 
security in higher education.  Kvavik and Voloudakis, through the Educause Center for 
Applied Research, surveyed higher education institutions within the United States and 
Canada regarding the state of computer security on their campuses (2006).  Twenty-six 
percent of respondents reported compromise of confidential information, and 12.5% 
reported damage to data.  It should be noted that Kvavik and Voloudakis do not 
differentiate between insider and outsider computer misuse in their findings, but they do 
report that Baccalaureate and Associate’s institutions are more concerned with unlicensed 
use of digital products and employees’ misuse of computers, respectively.  Further, in 
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their study of college students, Cronan, Foltz, and Jones (2006) found that 34% of 
responding students admitted to software misuse or piracy, and 22% admitted to 
committing data misuse. 
 With the exception of Kvavik and Voloudakis’ 2006 study and Cronan, Foltz, and 
Jones’ 2006 study, computer security in higher education has been relatively unstudied.  
This could be due to the idea that effective implementation of computer security is 
difficult in a higher education setting, mainly due to environment and culture.   
Higher Education Culture 
 With its roots in the early 1800’s, the Germanic notion of academic freedom has 
permeated the culture of American higher education.  One definition of academic 
freedom is “freedom for students to choose their own studies and freedom for professors 
to study and teach what they would [choose]” (Cohen, 1998, p. 128).  Wolff (1969) 
probably best summed up the culture ideal of higher education institutions: 
[T]he fundamental purpose of this community (the university) is the preservation 
and advancement of learning and the pursuit of truth in an atmosphere of freedom 
and mutual respect, in which the intellectual freedoms of teaching, expression, 
research, and debate are guaranteed absolutely. (p. 131) 
Though Wolff’s views are, indeed, a cultural “ideal,” the tenants of academic freedom 
juxtaposed against higher education taking on a more bureaucratic and business-like 
atmosphere are a reality, a trend that is expected to only increase in the future within the 
topic of accountability of higher education.  As long as colleges and universities receive 
public funds, they will be expected to not only provide proof that specific outcomes have 
been attained, but that the attainment of those outcomes have been made in the most 
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efficient manner possible (Berdahl & McConnell, 1999).  These demands represent the 
growing influence of business and industry on higher education, with the subsequent 
rules and procedures that follow.  The constant battle between the ideal of academic 
freedom and the growing demand for business-like operations creates an environment 
that is inherently difficult for computer security professionals. Computer professionals 
would prefer to not allow anyone to install software on university computers or allow no 
off-campus access to the internal network, but university professors demand some type of 
autonomy regarding their classrooms and how they choose to work.  From an 
organizational culture standpoint, this situation often creates subcultures within a college 
or university campus.  These subcultures then create their own set of rules and practices 
that are not always in line with the larger university policy (Keup, Walker, Astin, & 
Lindholm, 2001).  
 Change is another factor to consider in a discussion of culture in higher education.  
Higher education is likely to include students from a very diverse population.  This 
diverse population is likely to include students and employees of differing age, ethnicity, 
culture, and diverse learning needs (VanPatten, 2000).  In most situations, this diversity 
can only enrich a campus’ culture.  But the needs of computer security are different; 
computer security craves a homogeneous environment as it is easier to control.  There is a 
constant struggle between a computer security specialist’s need to implement a strong 
security plan and academia’s need to exchange ideas and encourage exploration 
(Oblinger, 2003). 
 A discussion of change in higher education is not complete without a discussion 
of technology.  The availability of technology has created learning experiences that were 
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previously impossible.  Consider a professor who conducts class from a classroom on a 
university’s main campus but through the use of teleconferencing equipment and 
software, that lecture is broadcast to multiple classrooms at satellite campuses across the 
state, possibly across the globe.  Students and faculty have access to untold amounts of 
research on the Internet.  Technology is so ubiquitous that a full discussion of its 
application in higher education is beyond the scope of this research.  Suffice it to say that 
technology has brought about numerous opportunities in higher education but, with these 
opportunities, come challenges, as well (Gumport & Chun, 1999).  Challenges come in 
the form of controlling the technology: providing access while limiting inappropriate 
activities, providing software for learning while limiting piracy, and providing resources 
for faculty and staff to do their jobs while limiting misuse of those resources. 
 Though higher education campuses face some unique challenges when it comes to 
combating insider computer misuse, lessons can be learned by studying computer misuse 
in the business world.  An even richer understanding comes from studying the problem 
from a criminological standpoint. 
Computer Misuse from a Theoretical Perspective 
 Computer misuse, whether the misuse in question actually violates any laws, 
appears to mimic most types of crimes.  There is the intent to commit misuse, weighing 
of costs and benefits, and the potential for punishment.  Though most of the current 
research focuses on the technologies used to combat computer misuse, in order to learn 
more about the behavior of an employee who commits computer misuse, it is useful to 
look at the field of criminology and examine three theories that have been applied to the 
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research within computer security.  These theories are: General Deterrence Theory, 
Rational Choice Theory, and Situational Crime Prevention. 
General Deterrence Theory 
 The foundation of General Deterrence Theory is the idea that punishment should 
be “certain, swift and proportionately severe” (Paternoster & Bachman, 2001, p. 14).  The 
roots of these attributes can be traced back to the writings of Cesare Beccaria who wrote 
an essay on penal reform entitled Essay on Crimes and Punishments during 18
th
 century 
Italy (1985/1764).  Through his essay, Beccaria (1985) hoped to reform the current legal 
system which was riddled with obscure laws, no uniform system of sentencing, and harsh 
and often cruel punishments.  Beccaria posed the idea that punishment for crimes should 
be swift and certain, and only be harsh enough to deter someone from actually 
committing a crime.  It is the certainty of punishment that is far more effective than the 
harshness of it.  This idea appeals to human’s natural sense of rationality.  People tend to 
use cost/benefit analysis when making any important decision, whether that decision is 
related to their career, a major purchase, or even a criminal act.  The idea that an 
appropriately harsh punishment is sure to follow a crime will tilt the scales more toward 
the cost end of the spectrum and effectively deter an individual from committing a crime 
(Paternoster & Bachman).  It is this dependence upon swift, certain and appropriately 
harsh punishment that can cause General Deterrence Theory to lose its effectiveness in 
practice. 
 Empirical criminology research has shown that there is a modest relationship 
between crime rates and appropriately harsh punishment (Gibbs, 1975; Nagin, 1978).  
However, the evidence for a relationship between certain, observed punishment and 
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crime rates proved to be a bit stronger.  The reasoning for this effect is fairly 
straightforward.  Someone who is contemplating committing a crime must be fairly 
certain that he/she will be caught in order for deterrence to work.  Moreover, if a criminal 
knows that a friend committed a crime and was not caught or punished, the credibility of 
the deterrent nature of punishment is eroded (Paternoster & Bachman, 2001).   
 Other researchers in the field of criminology have expanded General Deterrence 
Theory to include not only formal sanctions for committing a crime (i.e. incarceration 
and/or fines) but also informal sanctions such as disapproval from friends, co-workers, or 
a spouse (Anderson, Chiricos, & Waldo, 1977; Grasmick & Green, 1980; Nagin & 
Paternoster, 1991; Paternoster, Saltzman, Waldo, & Chiricos, 1983; Williams & 
Hawkins, 1986).  Expanding the definition of punishment to include any negative 
consequence allows the possible application of General Deterrence Theory to many 
situations, including computer misuse, as many forms of computer misuse are not illegal, 
thereby eliminating the possibility of legal sanctions for their commission.  Additionally, 
other researchers have found that crime rates decrease with the corresponding increase of 
police presence, thereby increasing the certainty that a criminal will be caught (Levitt, 
1996; Marvell & Moody, 1994).  If people know they are being watched, or “policed,” 
they are much less likely to commit a crime. 
 General Deterrence Theory has often been applied in the field of computer 
security.  Straub (1990) outlined the need for informing users about unacceptable 
computer usage and the penalties for noncompliance, along with the appropriate and 
consistent enforcement of these policies.  In addition to the effectiveness of outlining 
acceptable use policies and corresponding penalties, Straub found that the number of 
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hours per week dedicated to data security by information systems personnel, as well as 
the use of software that monitors employees’ activity, had a significant impact on 
employee computer misuse.  This finding supports the deterrence approach of policing.   
 Harrington (1996) outlined the idea that codes of ethics take the place of laws 
within organizations.  Even without the presence of formal or informal sanctions, it is 
possible that the very presence of a code of ethics and the dissemination of its contents 
suggests negative consequences will occur in the event of a violation (Tittle, 1980).  
Harrington’s study, however, revealed that codes of ethics are generally ineffective 
deterrents for computer misuse, with information systems-specific codes only slightly 
more effective at deterring sabotage.  One interesting finding of this study is that codes of 
ethics are effective in deterring those employees who possess a low degree of response 
deniability.  Response deniability involves to what degree a person takes responsibility 
for his/her own actions.  Therefore, someone with low response deniability generally 
accepts responsibility and lives up to moral commitments. 
 A third study that applied a slightly modified version of General Deterrence 
Theory reported results that were contrary to several previous studies (D’Arcy, Hovav, & 
Galletta, 2006).  The authors proposed that user awareness of security countermeasures 
impacts their perceptions of the certainty and severity of punishment for computer 
misuse, thereby affecting information systems misuse intentions.  In direct contrast to 
Gibbs (1975) and Nagin (1978), this study found that perceived severity of sanctions had 
a much greater influence on user intention to commit misuse than perceived certainty of 
sanctions.  Also, in direct contrast to Harrington (1996) is this study’s finding that the 
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presence of a security policy is an effective deterrent to employee computer misuse 
because these policies can increase users’ perceptions of punishment severity.   
 In a follow up study, D’Arcy, Hovav, and Galletta (2009) surveyed 269 computer 
users in eight companies regarding user awareness of security countermeasures.  They 
found that three practices deter misuse: user awareness of security policies; security 
education, training, and awareness programs; and, computer monitoring.  Further, their 
results showed that the perceived severity of sanctions was more effective in deterring 
computer misuse than the certainty of sanctions. 
 The lack of consensus among research studies in the field of General Deterrence 
Theory reveals the difficulty in finding one deterrence that applies to criminal behavior 
due to the variance in personalities and behaviors that are innate within human beings.  
Adding to this complexity is the fact that many people who commit computer misuse, 
specifically hackers, feel they are simply pointing out a weakness to a company or that 
harming a company is vastly different than harming another person (Conger, Loch, & 
Helft, 1995; Hafner & Markoff, 1991; Krauss & MacGahan, 1979; Parker, 1989; 
Samuelson, 1989).  Finally, companies are often reluctant to pursue people who violate 
laws because of the fear of negative publicity.  This is supported by the Computer 
Security Institute’s 2008 survey which found that only 27% of businesses who 
experienced a security incident actually reported it to the police.  Additionally, the survey 
reported that only 60% of companies attempted to identify the perpetrator.  These two 
factors undermine the reliance of General Deterrence Theory on swift, certain and 
appropriately harsh penalties. 
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Rational Choice Theory 
 While General Deterrence Theory focuses on the factors that can successfully 
deter someone from committing a crime, the Rational Choice Theory focuses on the 
decisions that criminals make during the commission of a crime.  Rational Choice Theory 
presents the idea that people make the decision to commit a crime much like they make a 
decision in other mundane tasks such as buying a television or a car, a process described 
by the expected utility model (Paternoster & Bachman, 2001).  Even when faced with 
uncertain conditions and without all necessary information, human beings choose an 
outcome that will be the most favorable for them.  This decision-making process is 
described in a model known as the subjective utility model (Paternoster & Bachman).  In 
the subjective utility model, it is not assumed that humans can gather, store, and process 
information perfectly; rather, they weigh the costs and benefits of their actions in order to 
make the most beneficial decision they can.  Even though humans go through the process 
of gathering and processing information, it does not mean that they make good decisions, 
nor does it mean that their interpretation of the world around them is correct (Cornish & 
Clarke, 1986).   
 Cornish and Clarke (1986), within their subjective utility theory, described 
criminals as modestly rational and contend that they often perform some type of planning 
during their decision to commit a crime.  It is important to note that the planning process 
for robbing a convenience store is vastly different than the process for stealing a car.  The 
perceived benefits for each of the two aforementioned crimes are vastly different, as well.  
It is through the study of criminals’ decision-making process that researchers can devise 
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ways to make crime more costly to the criminal, thereby preventing a crime from 
occurring. 
 Another important aspect of Cornish’s (1994) research on the Rational Choice 
Theory is crime scripts.  Originating in Gardner’s (1985) study of the field of cognitive 
science, crime scripts describe the steps necessary to commit a crime.  An example of a 
subway mugging script is shown below in Table 4.  The procedural stages of the crime 
are listed under the “Scene/Function” heading and the behavior is listed under the “Script 
Function” heading. 
Table 4  
Subway Mugging Script 
Scene/Function Script Function 
Preparation Meet and agree on hunting ground 
Entry Entry into underground system 
Pre-Condition Travel to hunting ground 
Pre-Condition Waiting/circulating at hunting ground 
Instrumental Pre-Condition Selecting victim and circumstance 
Instrumental Initiation Closing-in/preparation 
Instrumental Actualization Striking at victim 
Instrumental Actualization Pressing home attack 
Doing Take money, jewelry, etc. 
Post-Condition Escape from scene 
Exit Exit from system 
(Cornish, 1994) 
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 The use of scripts has been quite useful in the field of criminology to model the 
commission of various crimes from check fraud to the stealing of cars for resale (Lacoste 
& Tremblay, 2003; Tremblay, Talon, & Hurley, 2001).  Because computer crime or 
misuse involves some type of planning and a systematic method, the Rational Choice 
Theory and the use of scripts are appropriate vehicles for the study of this category of 
crime.   
 Just as breaking down a programming problem into individual steps of an 
algorithm can help a programmer create a program, breaking down the steps needed to 
commit a particular type of computer misuse can help the information systems security 
specialist define appropriate countermeasures.  Using the details outlined in the 1998 
U.K. Audit Report (Audit Commission, 1998), the crime outlined in the crime script in 
Table 5 below shows the steps taken by a council employee who committed computer 
fraud.  Because his colleagues would often leave their computers unlocked during their 
absence, the council employee simply accessed their computers and processed ₤15,000 of 
fraud using fictitious invoices (Willison, 2006). 
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Table 5   
Computer Fraud Script 
Scene/Function Script Function 
Preparation Gaining access to the organization 
Entry Already an employee with access 
Pre-Condition Wait for employees to leave their offices 
Instrumental Pre-Condition Access the unattended computers 
Instrumental Initiation Access the application needed to falsify 
invoices 
Instrumental Actualization Create false customer accounts 
Doing Authorization of fictitious invoices 
Post-Condition Exit the application 
Exit Exit the system 
(adapted from Willison, 2006, p. 318) 
Situational Crime Prevention Theory 
 Closely related to Rational Choice Theory is Situational Crime Prevention 
Theory, developed by Clarke (1997), a theory which also focuses on the decision-making 
process a would-be perpetrator goes through when deciding to commit a crime, but adds 
situational factors that might influence a criminal’s decision to commit a crime.  The 
main difference between Rational Choice Theory and Situational Crime Prevention 
Theory is that the latter focuses on the environmental factors that contribute to certain 
types of crime.   
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Situational Crime Prevention Theory has roots in research conducted during the 
1960’s and 1970’s by the Home Office Research Unit, Britain’s governmental 
criminological research department (Clarke & Cornish, 1983). In the course of 
researching different methods to reduce crime, it became apparent that opportunity 
reduction showed promise and warranted further investigation. For example, researchers 
found that the probability of a youth re-offending while residing at a probation hostel or 
training school was significantly reduced by addressing the opportunities for misbehavior 
in the institutional environment itself, and not necessarily addressing factors such as the 
youth’s background or personality (Tizard, Sinclair, & Clarke, 1975).   
 Though a focus on opportunity reducing factors is not consistent with most 
current criminological research, support for this viewpoint is found in earlier studies. Burt 
(1925) found that longer hours of darkness in winter promoted higher incidence of 
property offending.  Further, Hartshorne and May (1928) found that dishonest behavior in 
children is related to the amount of supervision they experience.  
 Psychological research in the area of personality traits also supports the inclusion 
of situational factors within the study of deviance. Overall, this research showed that 
criminal behavior was influenced by environmental factors such as opportunity and 
inducements rather than traditional dispositional factors (Briar & Piliavin, 1965; Matza, 
1964; Short & Strodtbeck, 1965) .  
 From this body of research and additional research in the study of problem-
oriented policing, the Rational Choice Theory, as discussed previously, emerged (Clarke 
& Cornish, 1985; Cornish & Clarke, 1986). It is through the combination of elements of 
Rational Choice Theory and elements of Routine Activity Theory that Situational Crime 
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Prevention Theory emerged.  Routine Activity Theory, though not normally used to 
explain computer crime, is an important theory in explaining the opportunity portion of 
crime commission.   
Situational Crime Prevention does not attempt to provide a panacea for the 
elimination of all types of crime.  Rather, it encompasses three measures that “(1) are 
directed at highly specific forms of crime, (2) involve the management, design or 
manipulation of the immediate environment in as systematic and permanent way as 
possible, (3) make crime more difficult and risky, or less rewarding and excusable as 
judged by a wide range of  offenders” (Clarke, 1997, p. 4).   
 Likely without realizing it, many people incorporate Situational Crime Prevention 
into their everyday lives.  People lock their doors when leaving their homes; they install 
burglar alarms; and, tell their children not to talk to strangers (Clarke, 1997).  It is within 
this realm that Situational Crime Prevention operates, but with a highly targeted focus.  
Due to differences in certain environmental or situational factors, the same measures 
would not be used to combat both a convenience store robbery and a home robbery.   
 Most criminological theories focus on the offender and his/her motivations, which 
are variable.  Likewise, when these traditional theories are moved into the area of 
computer security, their application becomes much more complex.  The motivations of 
those who misuse computers can vary greatly, as can their knowledge and skills.  Several 
researchers have developed taxonomies to describe the numerous types of computer 
criminals or hackers (Hollinger, 1988; Landreth, 1985; Smith & Rupp, 2002).  In direct 
contrast to the more traditional criminology theories, Situational Crime Prevention does 
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not attempt to explain criminal behavior or motivations.  It simply attempts to make a 
crime less attractive to a criminal.   
 In his early development of the theory, Clarke (1997) outlined 16 “opportunity-
reducing” techniques in his Situational Crime Prevention Theory.  These 16 techniques 
are grouped into four categories (Increase Perceived Effort, Increase Perceived Risk, 
Decrease Anticipated Reward and Remove Excuses), which impact a criminal’s decision 
to commit a crime through either increasing the cost or reducing the benefit, or removing 
the justification for commission.  For example, a countermeasure that falls under the 
Increase Perceived Effort category would discourage the commission of a crime by 
increasing a potential criminal’s perception that the crime would involve more effort than 
he/she is willing to expend. A countermeasure that falls under the Increase Perceived 
Risk category would discourage the commission of a crime by increasing the potential 
criminal’s perception that a crime involves more risk than he/she is willing to tolerate.  A 
countermeasure that decreases a potential criminal’s anticipated reward reduces the 
benefit that a criminal believes he/she will receive as a result of the crime. Lastly, a 
countermeasure that removes excuses reduces a potential criminal’s ability to justify 
his/her actions.  Beebe and Rao (2005) added a typical traditional crime analogy and 
corresponding computer misuse analogy for each of Clarke’s 16 opportunity reducing 
factors, as seen in Table 1. 
 The success of Situational Crime Prevention Theory has been noted in several 
studies.  Situational measures have proven successful in practically eliminating aircraft 
hijackings by screening baggage (Wilkinson, 1986) and reducing post office and bank 
robberies by target hardening (Clarke, 1997; Ekblom, 1988; Gabor, 1990; Grandjean, 
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1990).   Application of this theory in the field of computer security, however, has yet to 
be empirically explored, though the potential for success in reducing insider computer 
misuse is very promising.  Clarke (1997) has also noted that Situational Crime Prevention 
Theory is constantly evolving and its potential for applicability in many situations 
remains strong. 
 Situational Crime Prevention offers a holistic view of crime prevention that can 
be applied to computer security that previous theories have been unable to fulfill.  Beebe 
and Rao (2005) proposed that previous theories and strategies have concentrated 
disproportionately on a criminal’s perceived cost of committing a crime by utilizing 
strategies that would increase the chances of being discovered.  These strategies would 
include countermeasures, such as firewalls, network monitoring software and physical 
security.  An effective strategy would implement countermeasures that would affect both 
the criminal’s perceived cost (likelihood of being discovered and punished) and benefit 
(rewards of perpetrating the crime).  This strategy closely mimics previous research 
which stresses the need for a combination of technical (e.g. firewalls, passwords, 
encryption), formal (e.g. policies and procedures), and informal controls (e.g. education 
and training programs) (Beebe & Rao).   
 While a number of researchers have proposed the application of Situational Crime 
Prevention to combat computer misuse (Beebe & Rao, 2005; Willison, 2006; Willison & 
Siponen, 2009), as of this writing, there are no empirical studies that test the relationship.  
Previous theories such as General Deterrence Theory and Rational Choice Theory have 
not consistently proven their empirical effectiveness, nor do they offer a holistic approach 
to computer security.  Moreover, with the incidents of computer misuse still at 
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unacceptably high rates, especially among insiders, it is imperative that researchers 
explore this relatively new theory and test its effectiveness in the field of computer 
security.   
 As this study endeavored to explore insider computer misuse, it was necessary to 
further update Beebe and Rao’s (2005) application of Situational Crime Prevention 
Theory to computer security.  A closer examination of the items listed in the Computer 
Misuse Countermeasure column of Table 1 revealed countermeasures that are not 
appropriate for a situation involving insider computer misuse, such as honeypots or 
honeynets, which typically are unprotected servers that deliberately lure outside hackers 
into uploading code and/or hacking tools in order to learn more about their attacks.  
Therefore, the researcher updated the Computer Misuse Countermeasure column to 
include countermeasures that are more appropriate for combating insider computer 
misuse.  The updated table appears below. 
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Table 6  
Updated Table with Appropriate Countermeasures for Insider Computer Misuse. 
Technique Traditional Crime 
Countermeasure 
Computer Misuse 
Countermeasure 
1. Target hardening Locks, safes, fences, 
armed guards 
External firewall(s), internal 
firewall(s), servers under lock and 
key 
2. Access control Gate codes, guard shack, 
receptionist, swipe cards 
ID/authentication systems, 
Kerberos, access control lists 
3. Deflecting 
offenders 
Pedestrian/auto traffic 
redirection, no loitering 
Clearly defined job duties, proxy 
servers 
4. Controlling 
facilitators 
Gun control, limit ability 
to communicate 
Strong password policy, required 
password change policy 
5. Entry/exit 
screenings 
Metal detectors, screeners, 
merchandise tagging 
Virus scanning, use of software 
such as Clean Access Agent for 
student network access, network 
log-in and log-out procedures 
6. Formal 
surveillance 
CCTV, security guards, 
police patrols 
Auditing and log reviews, email 
and web usage monitoring 
7. Surveillance by 
employees 
Responsibility and/or 
ability to monitor 
Review of resource usage, user 
training, reporting policies 
8. Natural 
surveillance 
Lights, etc. so passers-by 
can see activity in the 
building 
Workstations located in visible 
area, cameras in data-sensitive 
areas 
9. Target removal Electronic donations vs. 
cash, cash diverted to safe 
Database 
partitioning/segmentation, use of 
database views, VPN’s for off-
campus network access 
10. Identifying 
property 
VIN etched into auto 
glass, write name in book 
Data classification, tagged 
identification of campus hardware 
and software 
11. Reducing 
temptation 
Obscure valuables, gender 
neutral phonebook 
Controlled distribution of campus 
software, software inventory 
system, use of screen saver lock 
on workstations 
12. Denying benefits Security coded car radios, 
ink tags on clothing 
Encryption, automatic data 
destruction mechanisms, network 
packet shaping 
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Technique Traditional Crime 
Countermeasure 
Computer Misuse 
Countermeasure 
13. Rule 
setting/clarification 
Acceptable use policy, 
clear laws, licensing 
procedures 
Acceptable use policy, user 
agreements, clear rules and 
procedures 
14. Stimulating 
conscience 
“Shoplifting is stealing” 
signs, “current speed is” 
Dissemination of anti-misuse 
information, codes of ethics 
16. Facilitating 
compliance 
“Graffiti boards”, public 
urinals, shelters, barriers 
Offer software at reduced prices, 
required new user training on 
proper use of systems 
 
 The majority of the countermeasures in the updated table above were derived 
from an extensive review of computer security literature.  Please see Tables 2 and 3 for 
appropriate references. 
 One of the main tenets of Situational Crime Prevention Theory is that it can be 
tailored to individual environments, making it an ideal base for computer security in 
higher education. The unique mixture of environments in higher education demands a 
scalable and flexible solution to computer misuse.  Therefore, this study explored the 
relationships between insider computer misuse countermeasures that fall under 
Situational Crime Prevention’s 16 opportunity-reducing techniques and the number of 
known incidents of insider computer misuse for certain institutions of higher education. 
Chapter Summary 
 Straub (1990) defined computer misuse as “unauthorized and deliberate misuse of 
assets of the local organizational information system by individuals” (p. 257).  Examples 
of misuse might include unauthorized network access, tampering with or stealing 
sensitive data, abusing e-mail privileges, or installing unlicensed software.  Many 
industry surveys have shown that insider computer misuse, or misuse that is committed 
by an employee, is a pervasive problem for businesses (Computer Security Institute, 
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2007; Computer Security Institute, 2008; Department for Business Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform, 2007).  Insider computer misuse has also been identified as a 
problem, though with fewer incidents, in higher education (Kvavik & Voloudakis, 2006). 
 Numerous studies have recommended a number of different countermeasures to 
combat the problem of insider computer misuse.  Countermeasures can either be 
classified as technical or administrative.  The most common technical countermeasures 
found in the literature include authentication for resource access, monitoring software, 
and data access control using security levels (Aldhizer, 2008; D’Arcy & Hovav, 2007; 
Panko & Beh, 2002; Straub, 1990; Urbaczewski & Jessup, 2002).   
 Though technical countermeasures are extremely important, many authors reflect 
upon the propensity of some companies to rely solely on these technical countermeasures 
(Osborne, 1998; Parker, 1997; von Solms, 2001).  With a complete emphasis on technical 
controls, the administrative category of countermeasures is ignored, creating a very one-
sided security plan.  The most common administrative countermeasures are Acceptable 
Use Policies, Codes of Ethics, password policies, and employee training. 
 Despite the presence of countermeasures, insider computer misuse still occurs. In 
a higher education environment, this could be due to the idea that effective 
implementation of computer security is difficult in a higher education setting, mainly due 
to environment and culture.  Academic freedom is a tradition in higher education, but 
does not blend with the controlling nature of computer security.  There is a constant 
struggle between an computer security specialist’s need to implement a strong security 
plan and academia’s need to exchange ideas and encourage exploration (Oblinger, 2003). 
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 Though higher education campuses face some unique challenges when it comes to 
combating insider computer misuse, lessons can be learned by studying computer misuse 
in the business world.  An even richer understanding comes from studying the problem 
from a criminological standpoint. 
 Situational Crime Prevention Theory appears to be a good fit for preventing 
insider computer misuse in higher education because of its inherent flexibility.  As the 
environment and culture of higher education can vary from institution to institution, and 
even within a single institution, this flexibility allows computer security specialists to 
tailor a security plan based on a campus’ individual needs.  Therefore, this study explored 
the relationship between Situational Crime Prevention Theory and insider computer 
misuse on campuses of public, four-year colleges and universities in the United States. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODS 
Introduction 
 Insider computer misuse is a problem in every industry, with consequences 
ranging from financial losses and loss of productivity to reputation damage.  Although 
research has shown that insider computer misuse is a problem on college and university 
campuses (Cronan, Foltz, & Jones, 2006; Kvavik & Voloudakis, 2006), the bulk of 
computer security research has been conducted in the business sector. Further, while 
researchers agree that insider computer misuse is a problem, no one method for 
combating this misuse emerges in the literature.  Most authors recommend a mixture of 
technical countermeasures, such as network and email monitoring, and administrative 
countermeasures, such as Acceptable Use Policies. 
 Situational Crime Prevention Theory assumes a number of technical and 
administrative countermeasures to prevent computer misuse. When applied to the field of 
information technology, a more holistic approach to preventing insider computer misuse 
emerges. However, to date, there does not appear to be a study in either the business 
environment or higher education environment regarding the relationship between 
Situational Crime Prevention and insider computer misuse. 
 Therefore, the purpose of this study was to explore the relationship between the 
categories of countermeasures in Situational Crime Prevention Theory and the number of 
insider computer misuse on college campuses.  The researcher explored the above 
relationships as an effort to help campus technology departments choose the most 
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efficient and effective security countermeasures.   From this data, the researcher 
responded to the following research questions and null hypotheses. 
Research Questions 
R1 – To what extent are the countermeasures that increase the perceived effort to commit 
insider computer misuse related to the number of insider computer misuse incidents on 
campus? 
H1: There is no relationship between the countermeasures that increase the 
perceived effort to commit insider computer misuse and the number of insider 
computer misuse incidents on campus. 
R2 – To what extent are the countermeasures that increase the perceived risk of 
committing insider computer misuse related to the number of insider computer misuse 
incidents on campus? 
H2: There is no relationship between the countermeasures that increase the 
perceived risk of committing insider computer misuse and the number of insider 
computer misuse incidents on campus. 
R3 – To what extent are the countermeasures that decrease the anticipated reward for 
committing insider computer misuse related to the number of insider computer misuse 
incidents on campus? 
H3: There is no relationship between the countermeasures that decrease the 
anticipated reward for committing insider computer misuse and the number of 
insider computer misuse incidents on campus. 
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R4 – To what extent are the countermeasures that remove the excuses for committing 
insider computer misuse related to the number of insider computer misuse incidents on 
campus? 
H4:  There is no relationship between the countermeasures that remove the 
excuses for committing insider computer misuse and the number of insider 
computer misuse incidents on campus. 
R5 – What are the respondents’ top five countermeasures in terms of perceived 
effectiveness? 
Research Design 
 As this study aimed to explore the relationship Situational Crime Prevention 
Theory’s four categories of countermeasures and the number of known insider computer 
misuse incidents in the year 2009, a quantitative approach was the most appropriate.  
Further, the collected data were numeric in nature and there was no need for open-ended 
questions.  Therefore, the data were collected using a web-accessible questionnaire 
created in SurveyMonkey©.   
 The researcher posited that a relationship exists between the number of 
countermeasures in place at each institution and the number of computer misuse incidents 
experienced at each institution. Therefore, the independent variables are the categories of 
countermeasures from Situational Crime Prevention Theory: countermeasures to increase 
the perceived effort of the offender, countermeasures to increase the perceived risk of the 
offender, countermeasures to decrease the anticipated reward of the offender, and 
countermeasures to remove the excuses for the offender.  The dependent variable is the 
number of known incidents of insider computer misuse in the year 2009.  
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Figure 2 below shows this study’s conceptual framework with labeled hypotheses 
between the constructs.  
 
 
Figure 2: Conceptual Framework with Labeled Hypotheses 
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Sample and Sampling 
 The population for the current research study was public, four-year colleges and 
universities in the United States.  By targeting only public, four-year colleges and 
universities and not including two-year or private institutions, it was hoped that 
differences in extraneous variables such as budget, size of technology staff, and mission 
of the institution would be mitigated.  According to the National Center for Education 
Statistics, there are currently 652 public, four-year colleges and universities in the United 
States.   
 The respondents for the current research were Chief Information Officers (CIO’s) 
or administrators of equivalent position at public, four-year colleges and universities 
within the United States. As the survey requested data regarding countermeasures found 
within the field of computer security, a CIO or equivalent administrator at each campus 
was identified as the most knowledgeable person to participate in the study.  The names 
and email addresses of each CIO were gathered using information on each campus’ 
website, from the governing body for higher education in each state, from Educause, an 
organization for the advancement of technology in higher education, and, failing all of 
the above, a phone call to each institution.  The researcher found 442 names and email 
addresses for CIO’s or administrators of equivalent position at public, four-year 
institutions across the United States.   
 In return for their response, each respondent was offered a copy of the results so 
that he/she can compare the countermeasures in place at his/her campus with those in 
place at other institutions.  In order to provide the most useful data possible to each CIO, 
63  
the results were categorized based on institution size.  Institution size was included solely 
for the purpose of providing data to the participants and was not used for analysis. 
Instrumentation 
 As there is currently no instrument available to properly measure the variables in 
this study, the instrument was researcher-developed.  Initial development of the 
instrument began by using a modified version of Beebe and Rao’s (2005) initial mapping 
of Clarke’s (2007) original 16 Situational Crime Prevention countermeasures to the field 
of computer security. A listing of the countermeasures with the corresponding 
questionnaire items appears below in Table 7.  
Table 7  
 Countermeasures and Corresponding Questionnaire Items 
Technique Traditional Crime 
Countermeasure 
Computer Misuse 
Countermeasure 
Question/Item 
Numbers 
1. Target hardening Locks, safes, 
fences, armed 
guards 
External firewall(s), 
internal firewall(s), servers 
under lock and key 
Question 3, 
items 1-3 
2. Access control Gate codes, guard 
shack, receptionist, 
swipe cards 
ID/authentication systems, 
Kerberos, access control 
lists 
Question 3, 
items 4-6 
3. Deflecting 
offenders 
Pedestrian/auto 
traffic redirection, 
no loitering 
Clearly defined job duties, 
proxy servers 
Question 3, 
items 7-8 
4. Controlling 
facilitators 
Gun control, limit 
ability to 
communicate 
Strong password policy, 
required password change 
policy 
Question 3, 
items 9-10 
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Technique Traditional Crime 
Countermeasure 
Computer Misuse 
Countermeasure 
Question/Item 
Numbers 
5. Entry/exit 
screenings 
Metal detectors, 
screeners, 
merchandise 
tagging 
Virus scanning, use of 
software such as Clean 
Access Agent for student 
network access, network 
log-in and log-out 
procedures 
Question 3, 
items 11-13 
6. Formal 
surveillance 
CCTV, security 
guards, police 
patrols 
Auditing and log reviews, 
email and web usage 
monitoring 
Question 3, 
items 14-16 
7. Surveillance by 
employees 
Responsibility 
and/or ability to 
monitor 
Review of resource usage, 
user training, reporting 
policies 
Question 3, 
items 17-19 
8. Natural 
surveillance 
Lights, etc. so 
passers-by can see 
activity in the 
building 
Workstations located in 
visible area, cameras in 
data-sensitive areas 
Question 3, 
items 20-21 
9. Target removal Electronic 
donations vs. cash, 
cash diverted to 
safe 
Database 
partitioning/segmentation, 
use of database views, 
VPN’s for off-campus 
network access 
Question 3, 
items 22-24 
10. Identifying 
property 
VIN etched into 
auto glass, write 
name in book 
Data classification, tagged 
identification of campus 
hardware and software 
Question 3, 
items 25-27 
11. Reducing 
temptation 
Obscure valuables, 
gender neutral 
phonebook 
Controlled distribution of 
campus software, software 
inventory system, use of 
screen saver lock on 
workstations 
Question 3, 
items 28-30 
12. Denying 
benefits 
Security coded car 
radios, ink tags on 
clothing 
Encryption, automatic data 
destruction mechanisms, 
network packet shaping 
Question 3, 
items 31-33 
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Technique Traditional Crime 
Countermeasure 
Computer Misuse 
Countermeasure 
Question/Item 
Numbers 
13. Rule 
setting/clarification 
Acceptable use 
policy, clear laws, 
licensing 
procedures 
Acceptable use policy, 
user agreements, clear 
rules and procedures 
Question 3, 
items 34-36 
14. Stimulating 
conscience 
“Shoplifting is 
stealing” signs, 
“current speed is” 
Dissemination of anti-
misuse information, codes 
of ethics 
Question 3, 
items 37-38 
15. Controlling 
disinhibitors 
Controlling 
drugs/alcohol, 
propaganda, 
violent TV 
Cyber-ethics education, 
supervised computer use, 
employee access to 
approved websites only 
Question 3, 
items 39-41 
16. Facilitating 
compliance 
“Graffiti boards”, 
public urinals, 
shelters, barriers 
Offer software at reduced 
prices, required new user 
training on proper use of 
systems 
Question 3, 
items 42-43 
 
 
The countermeasures used in the updated table were derived from an extensive literature 
review. Appropriate references for each countermeasure are seen in Tables 2 and 3. After 
reviewing the data gathered from Beebe and Rao’s (2005) table and the literature, the 
researcher constructed the questionnaire, as presented in Appendix A. 
 The respondents were given a list of specific countermeasures and asked if they 
utilize any of those countermeasures on their campus.  If a CIO checks the box next to a 
particular countermeasure indicating that this countermeasure is in place at his/her 
campus, that data was recorded as a 1. The absence of a checkmark was recorded as a 0. 
The last question on the questionnaire asked the respondents to rank their top five 
countermeasures in terms of perceived effectiveness. This data provided additional 
insight into the state of computer security in higher education by identifying the most 
popular countermeasures that CIO’s have implemented on their campuses. 
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Pilot Study 
 As the instrument used in this study was researcher-developed, a pilot study was 
required to ensure the listed countermeasures and wording are appropriate.  A pilot study 
consisting of CIO’s from eight colleges and universities within the state of Georgia was 
conducted. Data from these institutions were not included in the final data collection. 
 The CIO’s from these eight institutions were sent an email containing a link to the 
questionnaire, information about the research, and the expectations regarding their 
participation in the pilot study.  Separate from the questionnaire, pilot study respondents 
were asked to provide feedback based on their experiences when responding to the 
questionnaire.  In particular, they were asked to identify any terms that were unclear or 
needed additional clarification.  A representative copy of the email sent to each CIO is 
found in Appendix B. Based on this feedback, the researcher updated the questionnaire.   
Data Collection 
 Data collection began with an email to each CIO in the population.  A copy of the 
email is in Appendix C. The email contained a link to the questionnaire in 
SurveyMonkey©.  All of the collected data were numeric in nature, and there were no 
open-ended questions to code.   
 In its electronic format, the questionnaire was five pages in length with a total of 4 
questions. Questions 3 and 4 each contained 43 items. None of the questions required a 
free-form answer except for the question which asked the number of known computer 
misuse incidents in the year 2009.  Therefore, it was estimated that each respondent 
should have completed the questionnaire quickly with a minimum time commitment of 
no more than 15 minutes.  It is also important to note that each question in the 
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questionnaire required a response. Therefore, there should have been no incomplete 
questionnaires. However, incomplete questionnaires were still recorded and were 
subsequently discarded. 
 In order to maintain absolute anonymity for the respondents, the option to collect 
IP addresses was turned off in SurveyMonkey©. Therefore, the researcher could not 
utilize the address book feature in SurveyMonkey© for follow-up requests. However, a 
repeat email to each of the CIO’s was completed approximately five days after the initial 
invitation requesting response. As an incentive to fill out the questionnaire, the researcher 
offered, by request, a copy of the data results to each CIO. Twelve CIO’s requested a 
copy of the results. 
Data Analysis 
 The collected data were analyzed using PLS-Graph, a software package for 
statistical analysis.  As this study aimed to explore the relationship between the four 
categories of countermeasures and the number of known insider computer misuse 
incidents in the year 2009, PLS-Graph was deemed an ideal software package for 
analysis. PLS-Graph utilizes latent variable path modeling using the Partial Least Squares 
approach. Additionally, PLS-Graph is less sensitive to matters such as sample size and 
data distributions when compared to other structural equation modeling software and 
SPSS (Chin, 1998).  In its analysis, PLS-Graph estimates the loadings between items and 
constructs, the path coefficients, and the correlations between the constructs in the 
proposed framework. Finally, PLS-Graph calculates t-values, which, when compared to 
calculated critical values, provides a basis for exploring the relationship between the 
constructs (Gefen, Straub, & Boudreau, 2000). 
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Reporting the Data 
 The data were reported in tabular format, as a tabular format was most suitable for 
reporting the numeric results of the statistical tests.  Finally, the four hypotheses and one 
research question were addressed individually and grouped with supporting data. 
Chapter Summary 
 Insider computer misuse is a problem for all industries, including colleges and 
universities.  With ever-shrinking resources, institutions of higher education must 
implement an effective and efficient security plan to combat this particular type of 
computer misuse.  In an effort to help colleges and universities adopt an appropriate 
security policy and plan, the current research explores the relationship between categories 
of countermeasures outlined in Situational Crime Prevention Theory, and the number of 
known insider computer misuse incidents experienced in the year 2009.  
 The population of the current research was all Chief Information Officers (CIO’s) 
of public, four-year colleges and universities in the United States, effectively rendering 
the population and sample equivalent.  The number of public, four-year colleges and 
universities in the United States is 652. However, the researcher was able to find CIO or 
equivalent administrator names and email addresses for 442 institutions. 
 The questionnaire was web-accessible using SurveyMonkey©.  Each CIO received 
an invitation to complete the questionnaire, with an offer to share certain aspects of the 
data in return for their participation.   
 The instrument was researcher-developed, necessitating thorough use of expert 
review and a pilot study of eight campuses.  Results of the pilot study were used to 
improve the clarity of the questionnaire, with an emphasis on appropriate terminology.  
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Further, composite reliability and factor analysis was completed to ensure that the 
questions within each category are appropriately related. 
 Data analysis was completed using PLS-Graph.  Descriptive statistics were 
computed followed by computation of path coefficients, t statistic analysis, and R-square
 
analysis to determine the relationship between the latent constructs and predictive utility.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
REPORT OF DATA AND DATA ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
 Insider computer misuse is a problem for all industry sectors, including higher 
education, and consequences can range from financial losses to reputation damage 
(Computer Crime and Security Survey, 2008; Cronan, Foltz, & Jones, 2006; Department 
for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, 2007; Kvavik & Voloudakis, 2006).  
Though many researchers have addressed the prevention of computer misuse, no clear 
solution exists. Most authors recommend a mixture of technical and administrative 
countermeasures to best combat the issue, though there is little agreement among the 
authors’ findings. Moreover, much of the literature on computer misuse is limited to the 
business sector, leaving colleges and universities a relatively unstudied group. Therefore, 
the current research proposed to apply a theory which offers a balanced mixture of 
administrative and technical controls, Situational Crime Prevention, and investigate 
whether a relationship exists between Situational Crime Prevention’s controls and the 
number of campus insider computer misuse incidents. 
 Using a questionnaire administered through SurveyMonkey©, the researcher asked 
the CIO’s of 442 public, four-year institutions of higher education in the United States 
about the number of insider computer misuse incidents in the year 2009, the 
countermeasures they have in place on their campus, and to rank their top five 
countermeasures in terms of effectiveness.  A complete copy of the questionnaire is 
found in Appendix A. 
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 Using the data gathered through the questionnaire described above, the researcher 
endeavored to answer the research questions and corresponding null hypotheses listed in 
Chapter III.  In this chapter, the researcher presented findings from the pilot study, 
changes made to the instrument as a result of the pilot study, and analysis of findings 
from the data collection. 
Research Design 
Pilot Study Procedures 
 As described in Chapter III, CIO’s from eight colleges and universities within the 
University System of Georgia participated in the pilot study.  Over a two-week period, 
the respondents were contacted individually with an email almost identical to Appendix 
B. The only changes to the invitation email were some personalization. After one 
reminder email, the response rate was 100%. 
As clear and unambiguous terminology is particularly important to this 
questionnaire, pilot study respondents were asked to provide feedback to the researcher 
outlining any recommended changes to the questionnaire terminology and an estimation 
of how long it took each of them to complete the questionnaire. Six out of eight 
respondents provided feedback. Based on the pilot study respondents’ suggestions, some 
of the wording was changed in the questionnaire, but the essential format of the 
questionnaire remained unchanged.  Specifically, questions 1, 3, and 4 were modified 
slightly to reflect recommendations from the pilot study respondents. Question 1 was 
edited to specify from which term the respondent should report his/her institution’s 
FTE’s.  In question 3, the item “Encryption” was changed to add different types of 
encryption, such as SSL (Secure Sockets Layer), PGP (Pretty Good Privacy), and 
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password encryption.  The Encryption item was identically changed in question 4.  The 
last page of the questionnaire was also changed.  The last sentence originally read “You 
may now close your browser.”  As the page included a “Done” button, one respondent 
felt that sentence was confusing.  The sentence was changed to state “You may now click 
the Done button below or close your browser.”  Finally, all respondents who indicated 
how long it took to fill out the questionnaire stated that the process took less than 10 
minutes. 
Data Results from Pilot Study 
 Data results for each respondent are shown in Table 8. The number represented 
under the category is a count of the number of countermeasures within that category that 
the CIO reported he/she had in place on his/her campus. 
Table 8  
Pilot Study Data by Respondent 
Respondent Misuse 
Incidents 
Increase 
Perceived 
Effort 
Increase 
Perceived 
Risk 
Decrease 
Anticipated 
Rewards 
Remove 
Excuses 
1 10 6 3 2 2 
2 5 5 5 6 5 
3 20 7 6 5 5 
4 15 9 6 8 6 
5 5 7 4 5 2 
6 2 7 7 7 2 
7 1 9 5 8 4 
8 8 7 4 3 3 
 
 Tables 9, 10, 11, and 12 show each countermeasure within the categories of 
Increase Perceived Effort, Increase Perceived Risk, Decrease Anticipated Rewards and 
Remove Excuses and the percentage of institutions that utilizes each countermeasure. 
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Table 9  
Percentage of Institutions That Utilizes Each Countermeasure in Increase Perceived 
Effort 
Technique Countermeasure Percentage of Institutions that 
Utilize the Countermeasure  
(n =8) 
Target 
Hardening 
External firewalls 100% 
Internal firewalls 88% 
Servers under lock and key 100% 
Access 
Control 
 
 
ID Authentication 100% 
Kerberos 25% 
Access control lists 63% 
Deflecting 
Offenders 
Clearly defined job duties 50% 
Proxy Servers 13% 
Controlling 
Facilitators 
Strong password policy 88% 
Required password change 
policy 
88% 
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Table 10  
Percentage of Institutions That Utilizes Each Countermeasure in Increase Perceived Risk 
Technique Countermeasure Percentage of 
Institutions that Utilize 
the Countermeasure  
(n =8) 
Entry/Exit 
Screenings 
Virus scanning 100% 
Rules regarding joining 
campus network 
88% 
Network log in/log out 
procedures 
63% 
Formal 
surveillance 
 
 
Auditing and log reviews 50% 
Email usage monitoring 0% 
Web usage monitoring 13% 
Surveillance 
by 
employees 
Review of resource usage 13% 
User training 13% 
Reporting policies 13% 
Natural 
surveillance 
Workstations located in 
visible areas 
63% 
Cameras in data sensitive 
areas 
63% 
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Table 11  
Percentage of Institutions That Utilizes Each Countermeasure in Decrease Anticipated 
Rewards 
Technique Countermeasure Percentage of Institutions that 
Utilize the Countermeasure  
(n =8) 
Target 
removal 
Database partitioning/ 
Segmentation 
25% 
Database views 50% 
Virtual Private Networks 88% 
Identifying 
property 
Data classification 25% 
Tagged identification of 
campus hardware 
75% 
Tagged identification of 
campus software 
13% 
Reducing 
temptation 
Software inventory 
system 
38% 
Controlled distribution of 
campus software 
75% 
Use of screen saver locks 50% 
Denying 
benefits 
Encryption 50% 
Automatic data 
destruction mechanisms 
0% 
Network packet shaping 63% 
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Table 12  
Percentage of Institutions That Utilizes Each Countermeasure in Remove Excuses 
Technique Countermeasure Percentage of Institutions that 
Utilize the Countermeasure  
(n =8) 
Rule setting/ 
Clarification 
Acceptable use policy 100% 
User agreements 50% 
Clear rules and 
procedures 
38% 
Stimulating 
conscience 
Dissemination of anti-
misuse information 
0% 
Codes of ethics 50% 
Controlling 
disinhibitors 
Cyber-ethics education 13% 
Supervised computer use 25% 
Employee access to 
approved websites only 
13% 
Facilitating 
compliance 
Offer software at reduced 
prices 
50% 
Required new user 
training on proper use of 
systems 
25% 
 
 As research question five is concerned with the respondent’s top five 
countermeasures in terms of perceived effectiveness, Table 13 below shows a ranking of 
the top five countermeasures. The score was determined by first transposing the data.  For 
example, if the countermeasure External Firewalls received a score of 5 from one of the 
respondents, that particular respondent ranked External Firewalls as one of his/her top 
five countermeasures but at the bottom of the effectiveness scale. Therefore, the score of 
5 would be converted to a 1.  Similarly, a score of 4 would be converted to a 2, a 3 would 
remain a 3, a 2 would become a 4 and a 1 would become a 5.  In essence, the scores 
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would simply be reversed so that, when summed, an accurate ranking could be 
determined.  As a result of the pilot study, the questionnaire was changed to make scoring 
of this item simpler. The respondents were asked to rank their most effective 
countermeasure with a 5, their next most effective countermeasure with a 4, and so on. 
Table 13  
Top Five Countermeasures in Terms of Perceived Effectiveness 
Countermeasure Score 
External firewalls 26 
ID and password authentication 20 
Virus scanning 16 
Servers under lock and key 13 
Acceptable use policy 5 
 
 Following completion of the pilot study, IRB approval from Georgia Southern 
University was obtained.  Official approval is attached as Appendix D.  The researcher 
then began the data collection process. 
Respondents 
 The respondents were CIO’s or persons of equivalent position at public, 4-year 
colleges and universities in the United States. The researcher did not request any 
demographic information about the respondents within the questionnaire.  
Response Rate 
 The researcher was able to find 442 contact names out of 652 public, 4-year 
institutions in the United States.  Therefore, emails were sent to the CIO’s or persons of 
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equivalent position at 442 institutions.  Of these 442 invitation emails, 101 attempted the 
questionnaire, for a response rate of 23%. Two emails were sent to each respondent, an 
initial invitation and a follow-up email. 
 To assure that enough responses were received to perform data analysis, the 
researcher referenced Cohen’s (1992) table for power analysis. According to Cohen’s 
table, for a medium effect size at the .05 significance level for four independent variables, 
a total of 84 responses would be adequate for data analysis 
Findings and Analysis 
 At the end of the data collection period, the researcher began analysis by 
downloading the data into an Excel spreadsheet.  A copy of the raw data is included in 
Appendix E. The data were then examined, and unusable or incomplete records were 
deleted. An unusable record is one where, most often, a respondent would type “don’t 
know” or “test” for the question that asked about the number of computer misuse 
incidents their institution experienced in the year 2009. After eliminating unusable 
records, the number of complete responses was 89. 
 Next, variable names were created based on the technique being implemented. 
For example, in Table 7, the first technique in column 1 is target hardening. The 
corresponding computer misuse countermeasures for target hardening are external 
firewalls, internal firewalls, and servers under lock and key. Therefore, the respondents 
answer to whether his/her institution utilized external firewalls would be represented by 
TH1 (target hardening, first question), and his/her answer to whether the institution 
utilized internal firewalls would be TH2 (target hardening, second question). The same 
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naming scheme was used for each countermeasure within each technique. An answer of 
“yes” was recorded as a 1, and an answer of “no” was recorded as a 0. 
 As the hypotheses are concerned with overall categories of countermeasures, i.e. 
Increase Perceived Effort, Increase Perceived Risk, Decrease Anticipated Rewards, and 
Remove Excuses, the responses for each countermeasure under each category were 
assigned to a variable representing each category, i.e. IPE for Increase Perceived Effort, 
IPR for Increase Perceived Risk, DAR for Decrease Anticipated Rewards, and RE for 
Remove Excuses.   
 The final part of preparing the data for analysis involved creating categories for 
the number of computer misuse incidents each institution reported on the questionnaire.  
This was completed because of the excessive number of outliers in the original data. The 
category instead of the reported number was used for data analysis. The categories appear 
below in Table 14. 
Table 14  
Categories of Computer Misuse Incidents 
Category Number of Incidents 
0 0 
1 Between 1 and 25, inclusive 
2 Between 26 and 50, inclusive 
3 Between 51 and 75, inclusive 
4 Between 76 and 100, inclusive 
5 Greater than 100 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 It is important to look at the data as a whole before any analysis is completed for 
each research question and hypothesis. Table 15 below shows how many of the 89 
respondents utilize each countermeasure listed on the questionnaire. 
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Table 15  
Number of Respondents that Utilize Each Countermeasure (n=89) 
Category Technique Countermeasure Item Yes  No 
Increase 
Perceived 
Effort 
Target Hardening 
External firewall TH1 86% 14% 
Internal firewall TH2 84% 16% 
Servers under lock and key TH3 90% 10% 
Access Control 
ID/password authentication AC1 97% 3% 
Kerberos AC2 35% 65% 
Access control list(s) AC3 87% 13% 
Deflecting 
Offenders 
Clearly defined job duties DO1 81% 19% 
Proxy servers DO2 45% 55% 
Controlling 
Facilitators 
Employees must use strong 
passwords 
CF1 81% 19% 
Employees must change 
passwords regularly 
CF2 78% 22% 
Increase 
Perceived Risk 
Entry/Exit 
Screenings 
Virus scanning EES1 98% 2% 
Rules regarding joining 
campus network 
EES2 73% 27% 
Network log-in and log-out 
procedures 
EES3 57% 43% 
Formal 
Surveillance 
Auditing and log reviews FS1 70% 30% 
Employee email monitoring FS2 8% 92% 
Employee web usage 
monitoring 
FS3 3% 97% 
Surveillance by 
Employees 
Review of resource usage 
information 
SE1 35% 65% 
User training related to 
security policy 
SE2 70% 30% 
Reporting policies for 
misuse incidents 
SE3 78% 22% 
Natural 
Surveillance 
Workstations located in 
visible areas 
NS1 37% 63% 
Cameras in data-sensitive 
areas 
NS2 33% 77% 
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Category Technique Countermeasure Item Yes  No 
Decrease 
Anticipated 
Rewards 
Target Removal 
Database 
partitioning/segmentation 
TR1 62% 38% 
Use of database views TR2 67% 33% 
Use of virtual private 
networks 
TR3 91% 9% 
Identifying 
Property 
Data classification IP1 64% 36% 
Tagged identification of 
campus hardware 
IP2 73% 27% 
Tagged identification of 
campus software 
IP3 20% 80% 
Reducing 
Temptation 
Use of software inventory 
system 
RT1 38% 62% 
Controlled distribution of 
campus software 
RT2 71% 29% 
Use of screen saver lock on 
workstations 
RT3 72% 28% 
Denying Benefits 
Encryption DB1 89% 11% 
Automatic data destruction 
mechanisms 
DB2 15% 85% 
Network packet shaping DB3 67% 33% 
Remove 
Excuses 
Rule Setting/ 
Clarification 
Acceptable use policy RSC
1 
94% 6% 
User agreements RSC
2 
63% 37% 
Clear rules and procedures RSC
3 
67% 33% 
Stimulating 
Conscience 
Multiple dissemination 
methods of anti-misuse 
information 
SC1 40% 60% 
Code(s) of ethics SC2 40% 60% 
Controlling 
Disinhibitors 
Cyber-ethics education CD1 21% 79% 
Supervised computer use CD2 11% 89% 
Employee access to only 
approved websites 
CD3 8% 92% 
Facilitating 
Compliance 
Offer software at reduced 
prices 
FC1 69% 31% 
Required user training on 
proper use of campus 
systems 
FC2 37% 63% 
 
 Finally, the data were imported into PLS-Graph. Analysis began with construct 
validity and discriminant validity calculations, and calculation of composite reliability. 
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Next, path coefficients and t statistics were calculated for addressing hypotheses one 
though four. Though the majority of the data in this study is dichotomous, it is 
appropriate to analyze dichotomous data in the same manner as interval data.  Interval 
data is defined as having a set measurement scale of known magnitude. Likewise, 
dichotomous data can be defined as having two scales of known magnitude (Nunnally & 
Bernstein, 1984). 
Construct Validity 
 Construct validity was calculated based on examination of item loadings to 
construct correlations. The steps utilized to complete construct validity are outlined in 
Gefen and Straub (2005). In general terms, the item loadings on the latent constructs were 
calculated in PLS-Graph.  The output from this calculation was imported into an Excel 
spreadsheet, and this spreadsheet data were then imported into SPSS, software designed 
specifically for statistical analysis. Excel was needed because data cannot be directly 
transferred from PLS-Graph to SPSS. Once in SPSS, bivariate correlations were 
calculated, and the item loadings on each construct were examined. Table 16 below 
shows each construct with its corresponding items and loadings. Composite reliability 
with all items included is shown, as well as composite reliability with low loading items 
removed. Some items are denoted with an asterisks (*), which indicates that the item was 
removed from the construct due to a low loading value. Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) 
assert that each item should possess a loading value of at least .32 in relation to its 
construct.      
 Composite reliability was developed by Werts, Linn, and Jӧreskog (1974) and is a 
measure of internal consistency similar to Cronbach’s alpha. The difference is that 
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composite reliability does not assume tau equivalency among the measures. The values 
of computed composite reliability and computed Cronbach’s alpha should be interpreted 
similarly. Per Nunnally (1967), an alpha level as low as .6 can be considered sufficient 
for the early stages of basic research. 
Table 16
 
Constructs with Associated Loadings and Composite Reliability 
Construct Items Loadings Composite 
Reliability with 
All Items 
Composite  
Reliability 
with Low 
Items Deleted 
Increase 
Perceived Effort 
 .651 .770 
TH1 .332   
TH2* .066   
TH3 .787   
AC1 .741   
AC2* .166   
AC3* .264   
DO1 .462   
DO2 .377   
CF1 .559   
CF2* .093   
Increase 
Perceived Risk 
 .572 .743 
EES1 .500   
EES2 .418   
EES3* .059   
FS1 .468   
FS2* .159   
FS3* .036   
SE1* .023   
SE2* .191   
SE3* .029   
NS1* .235   
NS2 .541   
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Construct Items Loadings Composite 
Reliability with 
All Items 
Composite  
Reliability 
with Low 
Items Deleted 
Decrease 
Anticipated 
Rewards 
 .625 .695 
TR1 .344   
TR2* .265   
TR3 .604   
IP1* .027   
IP2* .035   
IP3* .273   
RT1* .279   
RT2 .531   
RT3 .443   
DB1 .541   
DB2 .516   
DB3* .265   
Remove Excuses  .541 .679 
RSC1* .014   
RSC2* .079   
RSC3* .089   
SC1 .378   
SC2* .153   
CD1 .718   
CD2 .350   
CD3 .394   
FC1 .583   
FC2 .411   
* item removed from analysis due to low loading value 
Discriminant Validity 
 Following removal of the low loading items, discriminant validity was conducted 
to verify that each item correlates highest with the construct that it purports to measure 
(Gefen & Straub, 2005). Table 17 shows each item and its correlation value for each 
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construct.  The values in bold confirm that each item correlates highest with its associated 
construct. 
Table 17  
Discriminant Validity Correlation Values 
Item IPE IPR DAR RE 
TH1 .332 .127 .183 .086 
TH3 .787 .242 .403 .094 
AC1 .741 .385 .539 .031 
DO1 .462 .248 .229 .086 
DO2 .377 .053 .202 .095 
CF1 .559 .210 .278 .035 
EES1 .451 .500 .513 .050 
EES2 .210 .418 .213 .045 
FS1 .259 .468 .255 .060 
NS2 .121 .541 .328 .095 
TR1 .142 .139 .344 .252 
TR3 .474 .198 .604 .047 
RT2 .324 .258 .531 .058 
RT3 .200 .221 .443 .110 
DB1 .306 .268 .541 .035 
DB2 .101 .260 .516 .048 
SC1 .338 .122 .272 .378 
CD1 .158 .237 .219 .718 
CD2 .098 .295 .233 .350 
CD3 .021 .327 .251 .394 
FC1 .179 .026 .152 .583 
FC2 .225 .177 .237 .411 
 
Data Analysis 
 Using PLS-Graph, path coefficients and t-statistics were computed using a 
bootstrapping resampling technique. In PLS-Graph, bootstrapping involves resampling 
with replacement from the original sample. The following analysis was conducted using 
200 resamples as recommended by Chin (1998).  The licensing agreement for PLS-Graph 
is included in Appendix F. A screenshot of the resulting graphical representation of the 
model constructs with associated survey questions is included below in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Screenshot of PLS-Graph Model Construct with Associated Survey Questions 
 The model complete with independent and dependent constructs, their path 
coefficients, and R-square value were included below in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: Model Representation from PLS-Graph with Path Coefficients and R-Square 
Value  
 The next step in analysis was to compute the critical value using the t distribution 
table, α = .05, a one-tailed test, and degrees of freedom of 88 (n – 1). Using these 
parameters, the critical value was 1.662.  To determine whether or not to reject 
hypotheses one through five, the t statistic generated by PLS-Graph was compared with 
the critical value. Therefore, if the t statistic was greater than the critical value of 1.662, a 
relationship between the construct and the dependent variable existed and the hypothesis 
was rejected. If the t statistic was less than or equal to the critical value of 1.662, there 
was no relationship between the construct and the dependent variable, and the hypothesis 
was not rejected. 
Reported Incidents of 
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(R-square
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.392 
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 Hypothesis 1. 
H1:  There is no relationship between the countermeasures that increase the perceived 
effort to commit insider computer misuse and the number of insider computer misuse 
incidents on campus. 
 Finding and Discussion. 
 The path coefficient between the construct of Increase Perceived Effort and the 
dependent variable of Number of Computer Misuse Incidents was negative at .121. The t 
statistic was 1.019, which is less than the critical value of 1.662. Therefore, H1 should 
not be rejected.   
 Hypothesis 2. 
H2:  There is no relationship between the countermeasures that increase the perceived 
risk to commit insider computer misuse and the number of insider computer misuse 
incidents on campus. 
 Finding and Discussion. 
 The path coefficient between the construct of Increase Perceived Risk and the 
dependent variable of Number of Computer Misuse Incidents was negative at .193. The t 
statistic was 1.621, which is just under the critical value of 1.662. Therefore, H2 should 
not be rejected.   
 Hypothesis 3. 
H3:  There is no relationship between the countermeasures that decrease the anticipated 
rewards to commit insider computer misuse and the number of insider computer misuse 
incidents on campus. 
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 Finding and Discussion. 
 The path coefficient between the construct of Decrease Anticipated Rewards and 
the dependent variable of Number of Computer Misuse Incidents was significant with a 
negative value of .203. The t statistic was 1.919, which is greater than the critical value of 
1.662. Therefore, hypothesis 3 should be rejected. 
 Hypothesis 4. 
H4:  There is no relationship between the countermeasures that remove the excuses to 
commit insider computer misuse and the number of insider computer misuse incidents on 
campus. 
 Finding and Discussion. 
 The path coefficient between the construct of Remove Excuses and the dependent 
variable of Number of Computer Misuse Incidents was significant at .368. The t statistic 
was 2.697, which is greater than the critical value of 1.662. Therefore, H4 should be 
rejected. 
 Predictive Value of Model. 
 In order to examine the predictive value of the model, it was necessary to look at 
the R-square value computed by PLS-Graph. For the current model, the R-square value is 
.26, which is interpreted as 26% of the variance in the Number of Computer Misuse 
Incidents is explained by the constructs Increase Perceived Effort, Increase Perceived 
Risk, Decrease Anticipated Rewards, and Remove Excuses. Additionally, the construct 
that appears to have the greatest negative influence on the Number of Computer Misuse 
Incidents is Decrease Anticipated Rewards, with a negative path coefficient of .203. 
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Research Question 5. 
R5 – What are the respondents’ top five countermeasures in terms of perceived 
effectiveness? 
 Finding and Discussion. 
 Respondents were asked to identify their top five countermeasures in terms of 
perceived effectiveness and then rank those five using a scale of 5 to 1, with 5 
corresponding to the countermeasure with the most perceived effectiveness.  The top five 
countermeasures with the corresponding score are shown in Table 18 below. 
 
Table 18  
 
Respondents’ Top Five Countermeasures in Terms of Perceived Effectiveness with Score 
Ranking 
 
Countermeasure Score 
ID and password authentication 142 
External firewalls 121 
Employees must use strong passwords 121 
Virus scanning 114 
User training related to security policy 103 
 
It is interesting to note that three out of the five top countermeasures would fall into the 
Increase Perceived Effort category, which did not demonstrate a significant relationship 
with the number of computer misuse incidents. The fact that three of the five 
countermeasures are technical in nature supports Beebe and Rao’s (2005) assertion that 
most security plans are imbalanced in favor of technical countermeasures, while often 
overlooking the more human or administrative controls.  
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Calculated Observed Power. 
 A Type II error occurs when a researcher fails to reject a false null hypothesis. To 
calculate the probability of a Type II error, the researcher calculated the power of the 
current test using the parameters of α = .05, number of predictors = 4, R-square = .259, 
and sample size = 89. The calculated power was .997 (Soper, 2010).  Therefore, the 
probability of failing to reject a false null hypothesis for this study is .3%. 
Chapter Summary 
 Data analysis began with the completion of a pilot study consisting of eight 
colleges and universities within the University System of Georgia. Pilot study 
respondents were also asked to provide feedback regarding the terminology used in the 
questionnaire and whether it was clear and appropriate, and how long it took them to 
complete the questionnaire. Using suggestions from the pilot study group, the 
questionnaire was edited. 
After acquiring IRB approval, the researcher sent out invitation emails asking 
CIO’s of 442 public, 4-year colleges and universities for their participation in the study. 
From these 442 invitations, a total of 101 people responded, with 89 responses deemed 
usable. This low response rate prompted the researcher to perform power analysis, which 
indicated that 84 responses would be sufficient for analysis. 
 For the remaining hypotheses, based on comparison of t statistics and critical 
values, H3 and H4 should be rejected, and H1 and H2 should not be rejected. The 
calculated power of the current test was .997. The predictive value of the model was 
examined using the calculated R
-
square
 
value of .259, which is interpreted as 26% of the 
variance in Number of Computer Misuse Incidents is explained by the model. 
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 The respondents’ top five countermeasures in terms of perceived effectiveness 
were, in order, ID and password authentication, external firewalls, employee use of 
strong passwords, virus scanning, and user training related to security policy. It is 
interesting to note four of the five top countermeasures are technology-dependent, while 
only one addressed the more human or administrative side of security controls. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
Summary 
 High-profile computer misuse incidents, such as the compromise of the Large 
Hadron Collider, tend to capture the media’s attention. However, the truth is that these 
types of incidents are relatively infrequent. It is the day-to-day incidents of computer 
misuse that erode efficiency and damage reputations of both businesses and educational 
institutions. Combating this misuse using countermeasures has been a common topic for 
information security research, with many different authors proposing recommendations. 
 Countermeasures can be divided into two overall categories: technical and 
administrative. Most authors recommend a balanced security plan with countermeasures 
taken from both categories (Dhillon & Moores , 2001; Straub, 1990; Willison & 
Backhouse, 2006). These recommendations, however, were for the business environment. 
Higher education institutions have remained a relatively unstudied group. Further, many 
studies favor one category of countermeasure over another instead of offering a blend of 
both categories. 
 Examining computer security literature from a theoretical perspective reveals 
three theories that have captured the attention of researchers: General Deterrence Theory, 
Rational Choice Theory, and Situational Crime Prevention Theory. This researcher chose 
Situational Crime Prevention Theory as a basis for study, due to its flexible, balanced 
framework that can be readily applied to computer security.   
 Situational Crime Prevention has proven successful in reducing crime in many 
types of situations including aircraft hijackings, post office robberies, and bank robberies 
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(Clarke, 1997; Ekblom, 1988; Gabor, 1990; Grandjean, 1990; Wilkinson, 1986).  
However, its efficacy in the area of computer security has yet to be studied empirically in 
either the business sector or higher education sector. Therefore, this researcher 
endeavored to study the relationship between categories of countermeasures in 
Situational Crime Prevention Theory and the number of reported insider computer misuse 
incidents on college campuses. It was posited that the data collected would assist higher 
education administrators to create an effective security plan. 
 Data were collected with a web-based, anonymous questionnaire. The 
questionnaire contained questions related to institution size, the number of computer 
misuse incidents known in the year 2009, and countermeasures in place on each campus. 
Participants were the Chief Information Officers (CIOs) or administrators of equivalent 
responsibility at public, four-year institutions of higher education. After a pilot study was 
completed to test the survey instrument, this researcher requested the participation of 442 
higher education institutions, with a final, usable response count of 89.  
Analysis of Research Findings 
 For hypotheses one through four, analysis using PLS-Graph produced the 
following results. Using t statistic and critical value analysis, H1 and H2 were not 
rejected, while H3 and H4 were rejected. Out of the four independent variables of 
Increase Perceived Effort, Increase Perceived Risk, Decrease Anticipated Rewards, and 
Remove Excuses, Decrease Anticipated Rewards appeared to exert the greatest negative 
influence on the dependent variable of Number of Computer Misuse Incidents. Further, 
regression analysis using computed R
2 
value showed that 26% of the variance in 
computer misuse incidents is explained by the current model.  
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 The respondents’ top five countermeasures in terms of perceived effectiveness 
were, in order, ID and password authentication, external firewalls, employee use of 
strong passwords, virus scanning, and user training related to security policy. 
Discussion of Research Findings 
 As of this writing, no researcher has reported data analysis on computer security 
with Situational Crime Prevention Theory as a foundation. Therefore, it is not possible to 
compare data results with any previous research. The reasons for this lack of data are not 
clear. However, some authors have asserted that research in the area of information 
security is particularly difficult due to the intrusive nature of the research and the general 
mistrust of anyone seeking to gain information about information security (Kotulic & 
Clark, 2004).  
 While the current research found a relationship between two of the independent 
variables and the dependent variable of Incidents of Computer Misuse, only one of those 
independent variables, the construct Decrease Anticipated Rewards, showed a negative 
relationship. The relationship between the construct Remove Excuses and the number of 
computer misuse incidents was positive, indicating that increasing the number of 
countermeasures within the category of Remove Excuses would actually increase the 
number of computer misuse incidents. This finding is counterintuitive. However, 
Harrington (1996) found that a Code of Ethics, a countermeasure found in the Remove 
Excuses category, has no effect on a user’s intention to commit misuse. Though intention 
to commit misuse is not identical to actual incidents of misuse, it is reasonable to assume 
that the intention to commit misuse precedes an incident of computer misuse.  
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 With one study finding a positive relationship between controls that would be 
within the category of Remove Excuses and computer misuse, and another study finding 
no relationship, it is possible that these types of countermeasures should not be 
considered of upmost importance when creating a security plan. 
 Putting aside the overall lack of empirical data for comparison, it is interesting to 
examine the list of countermeasures on the questionnaire through the lens of computer 
security literature. The researcher compiled the list of countermeasures on the 
questionnaire using information gathered from the body of research related to computer 
security.  The technical countermeasures were compiled using the research literature 
outlined in Table 2, while the administrative countermeasures were compiled using the 
research literature outlined in Table 3. Technical countermeasures tend to rely on some 
type of technology while administrative countermeasures rely more on policies.  
 Though some of the recommended countermeasures appear in literature that is 
more than five years old, respondents to the current researcher’s questionnaire indicated 
that these countermeasures were in use on their campuses. This finding presents an 
interesting conclusion. While the purpose of the current research was not to investigate 
new trends in computer and information security, it would appear that many of the 
countermeasures in place at colleges and universities represent old technologies.  The top 
five countermeasures in place are ID and password authentication, external firewalls, 
strong password policies, virus scanning, and user training, technologies that have been 
commonly used for a number of years. Perhaps it is feasible to consider the idea that the 
field of computer security in higher education is in need of newer ideas and technology. 
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 Beebe and Rao (2005) discussed the imbalance of common computer security 
countermeasures as found in Table 1. They found that 79% of commonly utilized 
countermeasures affected the perceived cost/risk of the crime, while only 16.3% of the 
countermeasures affect the perceived benefit of the crime, and only 4.7% removed the 
criminal’s excuses for possibly committing the crime. Using data from Table 18 of the 
present study, it is interesting to note the categories of countermeasures that are not 
widely utilized in higher education. Countermeasures that are related to surveillance and 
monitoring are not widely used.  For example, only seven of 89 institutions reported that 
they monitored employees’ email, and only three of 89 institutions reported that they 
monitored employees’ web usage. Despite literature related to inappropriate use of email 
(Fortiva, 2005), higher education institutions appear to be reluctant to use monitoring as a 
countermeasure. This is most likely due to the culture of higher education, balancing 
academic freedom with the need for control of technology.  While higher education 
professors demand a certain amount of autonomy in terms of technology, campus 
technology security professionals must continue to exert control over classroom 
computers and other technology resources. Therefore, there is a constant struggle 
between a computer security specialist’s need to implement a strong security plan and 
academia’s need to exchange ideas and encourage exploration (Oblinger, 2003). 
  In terms of this study, countermeasures related to surveillance and monitoring 
would fall under the construct of Increase Perceived Effort. Though the null hypothesis 
was not rejected, the t statistic was 1.621, just under the critical value of 1.662.  This 
relationship warrants further study.  Perhaps refinement of the survey instrument would 
uncover a relationship with the proper associated significance. 
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 Discussion of the categories of countermeasures would not be complete without 
addressing the rapid pace of change within technology. A countermeasure that is 
considered current at the time of this study may be outdated within a year or two. Readers 
of the overall findings of this study need to be cognizant of the passage of time and its 
relationship to technology. 
Conclusions 
 The most obvious conclusion from this study could be that the lack of strong 
predictive findings for each category of Increase Perceived Effort, Increase Perceived 
Risk, Decrease Anticipated Rewards, and Remove Excuses suggests that Situational 
Crime Prevention Theory is not an ideal model for combating insider computer misuse on 
college campuses. However, it cannot be ignored that this particular study is exploratory 
in nature. Further, the respondents’ inconsistent nature of reported incidents of insider 
computer misuse, as noted by the number of outliers in the data, complicated the 
correlational data analysis for this particular study. With this in mind, the current 
researcher is reluctant to dismiss Situational Crime Prevention Theory as an ineffective 
model within the study of insider computer misuse. It is possible, however, that the 
manner in which the data were collected and analyzed could be improved upon. 
 One of the most significant conclusions from the current study is the apparent 
lack of knowledge related to the number of insider computer misuse incidents on each 
campus. The variability of the number of reported incidents combined with those who 
responded with a “don’t know” to that particular question gives the impression that CIO’s 
are making security decisions based on incomplete or incorrect data.  Though the CIO’s 
could simply be reluctant to share that particular piece of data, it is not likely that a 
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respondent would be willing to share information about the countermeasures in place at 
their campus by answering that part of the survey and then not be willing to share 
information about the number of computer misuse incidents. This area warrants further 
study. 
 From a security plan standpoint, this research provides some insight on the 
categories of countermeasures that exert an influence on reported incidents of computer 
security. A relationship exists between countermeasures that fall under the categories of 
Decrease Anticipated Rewards and Remove Excuses and the reported incidents of 
computer misuse, noting a positive relationship with Remove Excuses and a negative 
relationship with Decrease Anticipated Rewards.  In light of Beebe and Rao’s (2005) 
finding that only 16.3% of commonly utilized countermeasures would fall under the 
category of Decrease Anticipated Rewards, it would appear that security plans could be 
enhanced by the addition of countermeasures within this category. 
 Finally, it would appear from the data as a whole that colleges and universities are 
utilizing the most common countermeasures found in the literature. Additionally, the 
pilot study group was specifically asked if they utilized any countermeasures that were 
not listed on the questionnaire and none indicated an omission. With the assumption that 
the list of countermeasures on the questionnaire was complete, the glaring lack of 
monitoring utilization on campuses is important. Because of its innate culture, it could be 
that what necessarily works and is acceptable in the business world is not necessarily 
appropriate or acceptable in higher education. There is more study needed in this area. 
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Implications 
 Higher education administrators are taxed with creating efficient computer 
security plans that guard their electronic data and computer resources against misuse. 
Therefore, the data contained in this study can provide a benchmark for CIO’s within 
higher education institutions to compare their countermeasures with those of other 
institutions. To date, most studies related to computer security have been conducted in 
the field of business and not within higher education. With access to a body of data 
related to computer security research within the field of higher education, administrators 
can create effective policies regarding computer security that more efficiently utilize 
ever-shrinking budgets.  
Recommendations 
 Based on the experience gained during this research study, the current researcher 
makes four recommendations. 
1. As this is an exploratory study, a future researcher may choose to alter the 
instrument or methodology in a way that makes correlational comparisons more 
feasible. Instead of asking respondents about the number of insider computer 
misuse incidents their campus has experienced, a series of questions about the 
effectiveness of groups of countermeasures may prove more fruitful for analysis. 
Additionally, utilizing the categories of computer misuse incidents in the 
instrument rather than asking for an exact number of incidents may improve the 
quality of the reported data. 
2. A higher response rate would be ideal in a future study. 
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3. As factor analysis revealed construct loadings that were comparably low, a future 
study should revisit the categorization of countermeasures in order to build a 
stronger instrument. 
4. Though the pilot study respondents did not indicate any omissions in the list of 
countermeasures on the current questionnaire, it might prove interesting to collect 
qualitative data that specifically asks the population if they utilize any other or 
newer technologies that are not present on the current questionnaire to combat 
computer misuse on their campus. 
Dissemination 
 The data in this research study is valuable to a number of audiences within higher 
education. First, Educause was the first organization to complete a similar study of 
information technology security in higher education. Therefore, this subject matter would 
be of interest at one of their conferences. Second, the peer-reviewed Journal of Higher 
Education Policy and Management might provide an appropriate avenue for the 
dissemination of these results. According to the journal’s aim and scope, their readership 
includes those higher education administrators who have the responsibility of developing 
policy. Third, the peer-reviewed Informing Science Journal of an Emerging 
Transdiscipline would be an additional avenue for publication. Informing Science aims to 
inform its readership about information systems through a lens of many different 
disciplines, including education. 
 The researcher plans to submit the results of this study within the next 12 months. 
After initial publication, the researcher plans to further refine the instrument and re-
collect data using the same CIO contact list.  This would serve two purposes.  First, 
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refinement of the data instrument could yield stronger relationships and predictive value 
within the model. Second, utilizing the same CIO contact list could alleviate the problem 
of the researcher being viewed as an “outsider” gathering sensitive information security 
information. 
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Dear Dr. _____________: 
Thank you so much for agreeing to participate in the pilot study for my dissertation at 
Georgia Southern University 
  
I am conducting research related to IT security in higher education and the questionnaire 
asks questions related to certain computer security countermeasures and, therefore, clear 
terminology is very important.  My pilot study will consist of responses from eight 
institutions within the University System. Your answers are completely anonymous as I ask 
no identifying information.    
 
In addition to the questions that you answer as part of the questionnaire, I ask that you send 
me an email regarding any survey terms that you found confusing or that need more 
clarification, and give an estimation of the time it took you to complete it.  Because your 
institution would be involved in the pilot study, I will not use your data in my final analysis. 
 
Thank you again for your participation in the pilot study. Please do not hesitate to contact 
me if you have any questions. My contact information is through Macon State College, 
where I am also a faculty member in the School of Information Technology. 
 
The link to the survey is: http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/5ZTMH2P 
The password is: tdsbger94 
  
Julie Santiago 
Assistant Professor, School of Information Technology 
Macon State College 
100 College Station Drive 
Macon GA 31206 
(478) 471-2808 
  
julie.santiago@maconstate.edu 
 
124  
 Appendix C 
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Dear Dr. ________________: 
 
I am conducting research related to IT security in higher education as part of my doctoral 
studies at Georgia Southern University.  I am specifically surveying public, four-year 
colleges and universities in the United States in order to learn more about the state of IT 
security on campuses nationwide.   
 
If you would like to participate in the study, please click the following link.  <insert 
SurveyMonkey link>.  The survey is rather short and should only take about 10 minutes to 
complete.  Additionally, your responses are completely anonymous and it is not possible to 
specifically identify your institution through the survey.   
 
In exchange for your participation, I am willing to share my data with you upon request.  
Though I cannot identify specific colleges or universities, I can categorize the data based on 
institution size.  Therefore, I can provide you with data related to colleges and universities 
that are similar in size to your own. Please email me at the address below if you would like a 
copy of this data.  
 
Thank you again for your consideration.  Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have 
any questions.  My contact information is through Macon State College, where I am also a 
School of Information Technology faculty member. You may also contact Dr. Teri A. 
Melton, my research advisor at Georgia Southern University, at 
tamelton@georgiasouthern.edu or 912-478-0510 if you have any questions. 
 
Julie Santiago 
Assistant Professor, Macon State College 
School of Information Technology 
100 College Station Drive 
Macon GA 31206 
 
(478) 471-2808 
julie.santiago@maconstate.edu 
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Raw Data for Incidents and Increase Perceived Effort 
Records 1 – 47 
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Raw Data for Incidents and Increase Perceived Effort  
Records 48 – 89 
 
 
131  
 
Raw Data for Increase Perceived Risk  
Records 1 – 47 
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Raw Data for Increase Perceived Risk  
Records 48 – 89 
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Raw Data for Decrease Anticipated Rewards 
Records 1 – 47 
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Raw Data for Decrease Anticipated Rewards 
Records 48 – 89 
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Raw Data for Remove Excuses 
Records 1 – 47 
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Raw Data for Remove Excuses 
Records 48 – 89 
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PLS-Graph User’s Guide, Version 3.0, February, 2001 edition Wynne W. Chin (author) 
Copyright Notice 
 
©1993–2001. Soft Modeling Inc. All rights reserved worldwide. No part of this publication 
may be reproduced, transmitted, transcribed, stored in a retrieval system, or translated into 
any language or computer language, in any form or any means, electronic, mechanical, 
magnetic, optical, chemical, manual or otherwise without the express written permission of 
Soft Modeling Inc. 
 
SOFT MODELING SOFTWARE LICENSE AGREEMENT 
The following constitutes the terms of the License Agreement between a single user (User) 
of this software package, and the producer of the package, Soft Modeling, Inc. (called Soft 
Modeling hereafter). By opening the package, you (the User) are agreeing to become bound 
by the terms of this agreement. 
 
If you do not agree to the terms of this agreement do not open the package, and contact the 
Soft Modeling Customer Service Department at a local Soft Modeling office (or an 
authorized Soft Modeling reseller) in order to obtain an authorization number for the return 
of the package. This License Agreement pertains also to all third party software included in 
or distributed with Soft Modeling products. 
 
License 
Unless explicitly stated on the program media (CD or disks), the enclosed software package 
are sold to be used on one computer system by one user at a time. This License Agreement 
explicitly excludes renting or loaning the package. Unless explicitly stated on the program 
media, this License Agreement explicitly excludes the use of this package on multi-user 
systems, networks, or any time-sharing systems. (Contact Soft Modeling concerning Multi-
user License Programs.) The user is allowed to install the software package on a hard disk 
and make a backup copy for archival purposes. However, the software will never be 
installed on more than one hard disk at a time. The documentation accompanying this 
software package (or any of its parts) shall not be copied or reproduced in any form. 
 
Disclaimer of Warranty 
Although producing error free software is obviously a goal of every software manufacturer, 
it can never be guaranteed that a software program is actually free of errors. Business and 
scientific application software is inherently complex (and it can be used with virtually 
unlimited numbers of data and command settings, producing idiosyncratic operational 
environments for the software); therefore, the User is cautioned to verify the results of his or 
her work. This software  package is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. Soft 
Modeling and distributors of Soft Modeling software products make no representation or 
warranties with respect to the contents of this software package and specifically disclaim 
any implied warranties or merchantability or fitness for any particular purpose. 
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In no event shall Soft Modeling be liable for any damages whatsoever arising out of the use 
of, inability to use, or malfunctioning of this software package. Soft Modeling does not 
warrant that this software package will meet the User's requirements or that the operation of 
the software package will be uninterrupted or error free. 
 
Limited Warranty 
If within 30 days from the date when the software package was purchased (i.e., invoice 
date), the program media (CD or disks) are found to be defective (i.e., they are found to be 
unreadable by the properly aligned media drive of the computer system on which the 
package is intended to run), Soft Modeling will replace the media free of charge. After 30 
days, the User will be charged for the replacement a nominal disk replacement fee. 
 
If within 30 days from the date when the software package was purchased (i.e., invoice 
date), the software package was found by the User not capable of performing any of its main 
(i.e., basic) functions described explicitly in promotional materials published by Soft 
Modeling, Soft Modeling will provide the User with replacement media free of defects (or a 
replacement component downloadable from the Soft Modeling WEB site), or if the 
replacement cannot be provided within 90 days from the date when Soft Modeling was 
notified by the User about the defect, the User will receive a refund of the purchasing price 
of the software package. 
 
Updates, Corrections, Improvements 
The User has a right to purchase all subsequent updates, new releases, new versions, and 
modifications of the software package introduced by Soft Modeling for an update fee or for 
a  reduced price (depending on the scope of the modification); however, purchasing an 
update or upgrade (for a reduced price) constitutes a replacement of an existing license and 
not acquisition of a new license. 
 
Soft Modeling is not obligated to inform the User about new updates, improvements, 
modifications, and/or corrections of errors introduced to its software packages. In no event 
shall Soft Modeling be liable for any damages whatsoever arising out of the failure to notify 
the User about a known defect of the software package. 
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Appendix G 
 
Bootstrap Data Output 
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Output results with Construct Level sign change preprocessing: 
 
Bootstrap raw data generated for Julie Santiago 
 
Number of cases in full model: 89 
 
Number of cases per sample: 89 
 
Number of samples generated: 200 
 
Number of good samples: 200 
 
 
 
Outer Model Weights: 
===================================================================
= 
                    Original    Mean of     Standard    T-Statistic 
                    sample      subsamples  error 
                    estimate 
Incident: 
    Incident        1.0000      1.0000      0.0000      0.0000 
 
IPE     : 
    TH1             0.2392      0.2088      0.3046      0.7852 
    TH3             0.4385      0.3473      0.2277      1.9256 
    AC1             0.3821      0.3178      0.2144      1.7819 
    DO1             0.0824      0.0654      0.2327      0.3541 
    DO2             0.1629      0.1293      0.2102      0.7751 
    CF1             0.2343      0.1842      0.1884      1.2434 
 
IPR     : 
    EES1            0.5342      0.4627      0.2299      2.3232 
    EES2            0.2439      0.2359      0.2389      1.0211 
    FS1             0.3243      0.2790      0.2189      1.4818 
    NS2             0.4111      0.3830      0.2482      1.6564 
 
DAR     : 
    TR1             0.1870      0.1623      0.2277      0.8211 
    TR3             0.4948      0.3966      0.1797      2.7532 
    RT2             0.3003      0.2359      0.2730      1.1001 
    RT3             0.0940      0.0206      0.2698      0.3484 
    DB1             0.3446      0.2938      0.1615      2.1340 
    DB2             0.3850      0.3794      0.1941      1.9835 
 
RE      : 
    SC1             0.0901      0.0891      0.2151      0.4190 
    CD1             0.5920      0.4807      0.2168      2.7310 
    CD2             0.1388      0.1197      0.2304      0.6024 
    CD3            -0.3554     -0.2859      0.2546      1.3960 
    FC1             0.4298      0.3517      0.2227      1.9298 
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    FC2             0.1440      0.1137      0.2031      0.7089 
================================================================= 
 
 
Outer Model Loadings: 
================================================================= 
                  Original    Mean of     Standard    T-Statistic 
                    sample      subsamples  error 
                    estimate 
Incident: 
(Composite Reliability =      1.000 , AVE =      1.000 ) 
    Incident        1.0000      1.0000      0.0000      0.0000 
 
IPE     : 
(Composite Reliability =      0.770 , AVE =      0.377 ) 
    TH1             0.3629      0.3255      0.3318      1.0938 
    TH3             0.8153      0.6703      0.2669      3.0552 
    AC1             0.7811      0.6534      0.2572      3.0369 
    DO1             0.5518      0.4518      0.2864      1.9266 
    DO2             0.4012      0.3156      0.2680      1.4970 
    CF1             0.6250      0.5113      0.2414      2.5890 
 
IPR     : 
(Composite Reliability =      0.743 , AVE =      0.421 ) 
    EES1            0.7129      0.6223      0.2612      2.7291 
    EES2            0.5729      0.5342      0.2195      2.6096 
    FS1             0.6427      0.5700      0.2295      2.8008 
    NS2             0.6591      0.6098      0.2058      3.2020 
 
DAR     : 
(Composite Reliability =      0.695 , AVE =      0.281 ) 
    TR1             0.3780      0.3327      0.2601      1.4535 
    TR3             0.6803      0.5601      0.2348      2.8978 
    RT2             0.5284      0.4472      0.2737      1.9304 
    RT3             0.4837      0.3608      0.2949      1.6404 
    DB1             0.5433      0.4320      0.2421      2.2437 
    DB2             0.5230      0.5021      0.1925      2.7168 
 
RE      : 
(Composite Reliability =      0.679 , AVE =      0.277 ) 
    SC1             0.4847      0.4254      0.2605      1.8604 
    CD1             0.7529      0.6430      0.2134      3.5275 
    CD2             0.3574      0.3048      0.2913      1.2269 
    CD3            -0.3378     -0.2846      0.2752      1.2273 
    FC1             0.6412      0.5416      0.2305      2.7819 
    FC2             0.4537      0.3867      0.2585      1.7549 
================================================================ 
 
 
 
 
Path Coefficients Table (Original Sample Estimate): 
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================================================================ 
          Incident    IPE         IPR         DAR         RE           
Incident  0.0000     -0.1210     -0.1930     -0.2030      0.3920 
IPE       0.0000      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000 
IPR       0.0000      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000 
DAR       0.0000      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000 
RE        0.0000      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000 
================================================================= 
 
Path Coefficients Table (Mean of Subsamples): 
================================================================= 
            Incident    IPE         IPR         DAR         RE           
Incident   0.0000     -0.1787     -0.1678     -0.2037      0.3680 
IPE        0.0000      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000 
IPR        0.0000      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000 
DAR        0.0000      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000 
RE         0.0000      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000 
================================================================= 
 
Path Coefficients Table (Standard Error): 
================================================================= 
           Incident    IPE         IPR         DAR         RE           
Incident   0.0000      0.1187      0.1191      0.1058      0.1453 
IPE        0.0000      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000 
IPR        0.0000      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000 
DAR        0.0000      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000 
RE         0.0000      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000 
================================================================= 
 
Path Coefficients Table (T-Statistic) 
================================================================ 
          Incident    IPE         IPR         DAR         RE           
Incident 0.0000      1.0190      1.6208      1.9191      2.6970 
IPE      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000 
IPR      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000 
DAR      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000 
RE       0.0000      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000      0.0000 
================================================================ 
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Appendix H 
 
Partial-Least Squares Analysis 
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        P   L   S   G R A P H                     
                 for                              
      Partial Least Squares Analysis              
            (2004 Feb 27)                         
 
    YEAR-MONTH-DAY: 2010-10-31 
     HOUR:MIN:SECS: 19:39:23. 
 
  (HOWDY PARDNER!!  HOW Y'ALL  DOING, EH?)          
0    600000 = Available Field Length. 
     600000 = Requested Field Length. 
 
0CPU-Time =   0 min  0.00 sec 
 Total =      0 min  0.00 sec 
 
0     Comments.. 
 COMM                                                                     
 PLS Deck generated for Julie Santiago                                    
0JBL                              1.8 
 ==================================== 
0--      P    L    S    X          -- 
0-- LATENT VARIABLES PATH ANALYSIS -- 
 - PARTIAL LEAST-SQUARES ESTIMATION - 
0                                     
                                      
0==================================== 
0Number of Blocks       NBLOCS =    5 
 Number of Cases        NCASES =   89 
 Number of Dimensions     NDIM =    1 
0Output Quantity           OUT = 2255 
 Inner Weighting Scheme  IWGHT =    1 
 Number of Iterations    NITER =  100 
 Estimation Accuracy       EPS =    5 
 Analysed Data Metric   METRIC =    1 
0==================================== 
 Block   N-MV Deflate LV-Mode   Model 
 ------------------------------------ 
 Incident   1   yes   outward Endogen 
 IPE        6   yes   outward  Exogen 
 IPR        4   yes   outward  Exogen 
 DAR        6   yes   outward  Exogen 
 RE         6   yes   outward  Exogen 
 ------------------------------------ 
           23               . 
 ==================================== 
 
0Real words needed    3803 from 600000 
0Char words needed     235 from  40000 
1                                                                         
0Dimension No.  1 
0Partial Least-Squares Parameter Estimation 
0Change of Stop Criteria during Iteration 
0Cycle No.    CR1         CR2         CR3         CR4         CR5 
 
    1  0.1355E+01  0.3912E-01  0.3558E+00  0.3290E+00  0.5296E+00 
    2  0.5551E-15  0.1276E-01  0.1110E-15  0.1110E-15  0.2220E-15 
0Convergence at Iteration Cycle No.   2 
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0B  .. Path coefficients  
 ============================================================ 
             Incident  IPE       IPR       DAR       RE       
 ------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Incident       0.000    -0.121    -0.193    -0.203     0.392 
 IPE            0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 IPR            0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 DAR            0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 RE             0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 ============================================================ 
 
 
0R  .. Correlations of latent variables   
 ============================================================ 
             Incident  IPE       IPR       DAR       RE       
 ------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Incident       1.000 
 IPE           -0.244     1.000 
 IPR           -0.299     0.520     1.000 
 DAR           -0.286     0.544     0.516     1.000 
 RE             0.292     0.223     0.156     0.211     1.000 
 ============================================================ 
 
 
0Inner Model 
 ====================================================================== 
 Block           Mean  Location  Mult.RSq  AvResVar  AvCommun  AvRedund 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Incident      0.0000    0.0000    0.2594    0.0000    1.0000    0.2594 
 IPE           0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.6229    0.3771    0.0000 
 IPR           0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.5790    0.4210    0.0000 
 DAR           0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.7187    0.2813    0.0000 
 RE            0.0000    0.0000    0.0000    0.7232    0.2768    0.0000 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Average                           0.0519    0.6394    0.3606    0.0113 
 ====================================================================== 
 
 
0Outer Model 
 ====================================================================== 
 Variable      Weight   Loading  Location  ResidVar  Communal  Redundan 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    Incident  outward 
 Incident      1.0000    1.0000    0.0000    0.0000    1.0000    0.2594 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    IPE       outward 
 TH1           0.2392    0.3629    0.0000    0.8683    0.1317    0.0000 
 TH3           0.4385    0.8153    0.0000    0.3353    0.6647    0.0000 
 AC1           0.3821    0.7811    0.0000    0.3899    0.6101    0.0000 
 DO1           0.0824    0.5518    0.0000    0.6955    0.3045    0.0000 
 DO2           0.1629    0.4012    0.0000    0.8391    0.1609    0.0000 
 CF1           0.2343    0.6250    0.0000    0.6094    0.3906    0.0000 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    IPR       outward 
 EES1          0.5342    0.7129    0.0000    0.4917    0.5083    0.0000 
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 EES2          0.2439    0.5729    0.0000    0.6718    0.3282    0.0000 
 FS1           0.3243    0.6427    0.0000    0.5869    0.4131    0.0000 
 NS2           0.4111    0.6591    0.0000    0.5656    0.4344    0.0000 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    DAR       outward 
 TR1           0.1870    0.3780    0.0000    0.8571    0.1429    0.0000 
 TR3           0.4948    0.6803    0.0000    0.5372    0.4628    0.0000 
 RT2           0.3003    0.5284    0.0000    0.7208    0.2792    0.0000 
 RT3           0.0940    0.4837    0.0000    0.7660    0.2340    0.0000 
 DB1           0.3446    0.5433    0.0000    0.7048    0.2952    0.0000 
 DB2           0.3850    0.5230    0.0000    0.7265    0.2735    0.0000 
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    RE        outward 
 SC1           0.0901    0.4847    0.0000    0.7651    0.2349    0.0000 
 CD1           0.5920    0.7529    0.0000    0.4331    0.5669    0.0000 
 CD2           0.1388    0.3574    0.0000    0.8723    0.1277    0.0000 
 CD3          -0.3554   -0.3378    0.0000    0.8859    0.1141    0.0000 
 FC1           0.4298    0.6412    0.0000    0.5888    0.4112    0.0000 
 FC2           0.1440    0.4537    0.0000    0.7941    0.2059    0.0000 
 ====================================================================== 
 
0Theta  .. Outer residual covariance  
========================================================================== 
          Incident  TH1       TH3       AC1       DO1       DO2       CF1      
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Incident0.000 
 TH1     0.000     0.868 
 TH3     0.000    -0.210     0.335 
 AC1     0.000    -0.175    -0.080     0.390 
 DO1     0.000    -0.141    -0.044    -0.047     0.696 
 DO2     0.000     0.013    -0.099    -0.270    -0.127     0.839 
 CF1     0.000    -0.168    -0.198    -0.104     0.146     0.073     0.609 
 EES1    0.000    -0.037    -0.044     0.188    -0.104    -0.158    -0.040 
 EES2    0.000    -0.058     0.084    -0.078     0.131    -0.044     0.013 
 FS1     0.000     0.032    -0.008    -0.169     0.099     0.152     0.118 
 NS2     0.000     0.057     0.014    -0.065    -0.021     0.111    -0.048 
 TR1     0.000     0.001     0.003    -0.067     0.016     0.055     0.059 
 TR3     0.000    -0.122     0.064     0.142    -0.080    -0.115    -0.120 
 RT2     0.000     0.104    -0.136    -0.037     0.094     0.069     0.128 
 RT3     0.000     0.103     0.015    -0.024     0.078    -0.083    -0.065 
 DB1     0.000    -0.014    -0.029    -0.016    -0.071     0.058     0.080 
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 DB2  0.000     0.062     0.045    -0.101     0.065     0.036    -0.031 
 SC1  0.000     0.054    -0.095    -0.095     0.061     0.194     0.122 
 CD1  0.000     0.070     0.016    -0.002    -0.030    -0.029    -0.068 
 CD2  0.000     0.043    -0.085     0.009     0.007    -0.021     0.111 
 CD3  0.000     0.042     0.029    -0.035     0.006    -0.032    -0.021 
 FC1  0.000    -0.131     0.059     0.000     0.000     0.003     0.022 
 FC2  0.000     0.131    -0.030    -0.026     0.091    -0.068    -0.019 
 Inc  0.000    -0.032    -0.022    -0.002     0.093     0.016     0.034 
 IPE  0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 IPR  0.000    -0.049    -0.039     0.170     0.085    -0.163    -0.070 
 DAR  0.000    -0.081    -0.036     0.135    -0.041    -0.034    -0.032 
 RE   0.000    -0.109     0.040    -0.032     0.075     0.062     0.018 
 ====================================================================== 
 
 
0Theta  .. Outer residual covariance  
 ======================================================================= 
             EES1      EES2      FS1       NS2       TR1       TR3       RT2      
 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 EES1      0.492 
 EES2      0.159     0.672 
 FS1       0.228    -0.163     0.587 
 NS2      -0.364    -0.063    -0.069     0.566 
 TR1      -0.179     0.102     0.118     0.080     0.857 
 TR3       0.187    -0.026    -0.079    -0.166    -0.181     0.537 
 RT2      -0.094     0.008     0.031     0.093     0.007    -0.216     0.721 
 RT3      -0.055    -0.070     0.016     0.100    -0.057    -0.001    -0.107 
 DB1       0.105    -0.044    -0.027    -0.089    -0.192    -0.108    -0.203 
 DB2      -0.161     0.034     0.040     0.157    -0.003    -0.337    -0.081 
 SC1      -0.134     0.034     0.197    -0.002     0.084    -0.191     0.098 
 CD1      -0.063     0.016     0.015     0.061    -0.021    -0.073     0.036 
 CD2      -0.071    -0.125     0.112     0.078    -0.023    -0.014    -0.001 
 CD3      -0.083    -0.018     0.088     0.049     0.062    -0.194     0.055 
 FC1       0.074    -0.020    -0.032    -0.059     0.036    -0.005    -0.013 
 FC2      -0.014     0.047     0.022    -0.027     0.100    -0.031    -0.033 
 Incident -0.045     0.053     0.036    -0.001     0.025    -0.025     0.018 
 IPE       0.273    -0.109    -0.068    -0.236    -0.045     0.091     0.041 
 IPR       0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.033    -0.072     0.085 
 DAR       0.143    -0.087    -0.075    -0.075     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 RE       -0.019    -0.014     0.012     0.023     0.248     0.010    -0.061 
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 =================================================================== 
0Theta  .. Outer residual covariance  
 =========================================================================== 
             RT3       DB1       DB2       SC1       CD1       CD2       CD3      
 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 RT3       0.766 
 DB1      -0.010     0.705 
 DB2      -0.065    -0.238     0.726 
 SC1       0.014     0.131     0.008     0.765 
 CD1       0.032    -0.006     0.074     0.044     0.433 
 CD2       0.020     0.030    -0.001     0.041    -0.020     0.872 
 CD3      -0.071    -0.012     0.205     0.263     0.306     0.149     0.886 
 FC1      -0.092    -0.031     0.049    -0.048    -0.307    -0.141     0.145 
 FC2      -0.061    -0.021     0.050     0.095    -0.117     0.007     0.188 
 Incident  0.097     0.003    -0.021    -0.104     0.024    -0.047    -0.048 
 IPE      -0.111     0.052    -0.146     0.230    -0.011     0.008     0.176 
 IPR       0.071     0.062    -0.061     0.300     0.102     0.129     0.222 
 DAR       0.000     0.000     0.000     0.199     0.038     0.105     0.283 
 RE        0.102    -0.003    -0.108     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 =========================================================================== 
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0Theta  .. Outer residual covariance  
 
=======================================================================
==== 
             FC1       FC2       Incident  IPE       IPR       DAR       
RE       
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------
----- 
 FC1       0.589 
 FC2       0.029     0.794 
 Incident -0.010    -0.073     1.000 
 IPE       0.065     0.134    -0.244     1.000 
 IPR      -0.102     0.124    -0.299     0.520     1.000 
 DAR       0.047     0.178    -0.286     0.544     0.516     1.000 
 RE        0.000     0.000     0.292     0.223     0.156     0.211     
1.000 
 
=======================================================================
===0        ==PLSW no prob, eh? 
0CPU-Time =   0 min  0.01 sec 
 Total =      0 min  0.01 sec 
0        No errors reported. 
 
 
